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ABSTRACT 
The continued presence of criminal aliens, non-citizens present in the United 
States either legally or illegally, poses a significant threat to the security of this Nation.  
While criminal aliens are present at all levels of our criminal justice system, ICE’s 
current criminal alien program only addresses criminal aliens encountered at the state and 
federal level.  This thesis examines how the Criminal Alien Program can be expanded at 
the local and county level, the possible effects this expansion will have upon ICE in 
detaining and removing criminal aliens and whether this removal of criminal aliens is an 
effective and efficient weapon in a terrorist prevention strategy.  Individuals from the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force and NYC Police Department’s Shield were interviewed 
concerning whether the efficient removal of criminal aliens is an effective tool in the war 
on terror.  In researching this thesis of expansion of ICE’s Criminal Alien Program and 
the issues that arise from such expansion, structured formal interviews were conducted of 
a representative mix of ICE field officials varying in size and physical location in the 
United States.  The creation of a megacommunity amongst the stakeholders involved in 
ICE’s Criminal Alien Program should be included in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 
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The continued presence of criminal aliens, non-citizens present in the United 
States either legally or illegally, poses a significant threat to the security of this Nation.  
Punishing wrongdoers through the application of the rule of law is a central principle to 
the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, whether these wrongdoers are masterminds 
of terrorist attacks or mere foot soldiers.1  Criminal aliens have the potential to become 
leaders and foot soldiers in the war on terror.  Whether it is through their own 
radicalization in the prison environment or financially supporting terrorists through 
criminal activity, criminal aliens represent a viable threat to the homeland.  Reducing 
criminal aliens’ presence in the United States reduces the number of potential candidates 
who could support terrorist groups.   
Criminal aliens are encountered within every level of the U.S. criminal justice 
system whether it is federal, state or local.  In a real sense, criminal aliens are a captive 
audience.  They do not need to be tracked down or located.  They are literally sitting in 
prison doing their time.  They are being housed and fed by the criminal justice system, 
they have been photographed, fingerprinted, and catalogued, and they cannot leave the 
prison walls without permission.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) needs to 
take full advantage of this situation to remove them from the United States and neutralize 
this potential threat to our national security.  Unfortunately, for years, immigration 
authorities have struggled to design and implement a system that would fulfill this 
obligation.  In this thesis, I argue that expansion of ICE’s Criminal Alien Program (CAP) 
could provide an optimal strategic response. 
A. THE PROBLEM  
While criminal aliens are present at all levels of our criminal justice system, ICE’s 
current CAP only addresses criminal aliens encountered at the state and federal level.2  
                                                 
1 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 9-13, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionV.html (accessed December 2008). 
2 ICE Fact Sheet, “Secure Communities,” (Washington, D.C., March 2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.htm (accessed March 2008). 
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Currently, ICE’s CAP involves only ten percent of criminal aliens encountered at the 
local level.3  While criminal aliens are in local law enforcement’s custody for a 
significant period of time, in many jurisdictions, local law enforcement does not consider 
a criminal’s immigration status.  If an alien is encountered at the local level of the 
criminal justice system, it is left to the individual law enforcement officer to make an 
Immigration Alien Query (IAQ) through the National Law Enforcement Telecom 
(NLET) database.4  Regardless of whether this inquiry is made, the criminal alien is often 
simply released from local law enforcement’s custody after serving their sentence.  They 
are not referred to ICE let alone detained.  Indeed some local law enforcement do not 
even query the immigration status of its inmates.  Instead, these individuals are released 
back into the general population where they often commit more crimes, including crimes 
that may financially support terrorist networks.  An effective criminal alien removal 
program would deport them from the United States before they had another chance to 
damage the Nation. 
ICE and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have many 
long-standing relationships with local law enforcement. However, ICE lacks working 
relationships with a large number of local law enforcement offices.  Additionally, a lack 
of bed-space and the manpower needed to detain these individuals hinders ICE’s abilities 
to deport these criminal aliens.  If an alien is encountered and referred to ICE, the aliens 
are often released from custody if they have not been convicted of an aggravated felony.5  
While the aliens are told to return for their hearing before an Immigration Judge, many 
abscond after they realize that they have no relief from removal and little chance to 
remain in the United States.  These absconders slip back into society never to be found 
again because, while ICE devotes significant resources to its fugitive operations teams, it 
does not have the manpower to locate these fugitives.  According to an audit conducted 
                                                 
3 ICE Fact Sheet, “Secure Communities,” (Washington, D.C., March 2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.htm (accessed March 2008). 
4 The Law Enforcement Service Center (LESC) has been tasked with responding to local law 
enforcement inquiries since 1998. 
5 An aggravated felony is defined at Section 101(43)(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. U.S. 
Congress, Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq. (2000). 
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by the Office of Inspector General in 2006, “most of th[e] incarcerated aliens are being 
released into the U.S. at the conclusion of their respective sentences because ICE’s 
Detention and Removal Office (DRO)6 does not have the resources to identify, detain and 
remove these aliens under its Criminal Alien Program.”7 
When criminal aliens are not identified and removed by ICE, many continue to 
pose a significant threat to the American public as they go on to commit further crimes.  
The statistics on recidivist rates amongst the immigrant population are staggering.  A 
2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that 55,322 criminal aliens 
were arrested in the United States a total of at least 459,614 times, averaging over eight 
arrests per alien; almost all of the aliens studied had more than one arrest.8 
These crimes often go on to financially support terrorist networks as there are 
established links between crime and the funding of terrorism.  In testimony before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in May 2003, Steven McGraw, the Assistant Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Office of Intelligence stated that “international 
drug trafficking is a highly lucrative enterprise generating billions of dollars in profit that 
terror groups can easily tap into, and that most if not all terror groups obtain financing 
from drug trafficking.”9  Just one example of the link between criminal aliens’ 
involvement in the drug trade facilitating terrorist activities can be found in the case of 
two Pakistani nationals who were arrested in 2002 when they attempted to exchange a 
large quantity of drugs for cash and anti-aircraft weapons that were to be used to support 
                                                 
6 DRO is one of ICE’s four integrated divisions whose responsibilities include ensuring the departure 
of removable aliens through the enforcement of existing immigration laws. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, “ICE Office of Detention and Removal,” News (November 2, 2006), 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/dro110206.htm (accessed November 2008). 
7 “Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 
General, OIG-06-33, April 2006, 2. 
8 Government Accounting Office, “Information on Certain Illegal Aliens Arrested in the United 
States,” May 9, 2005, http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-05-646R (accessed 
September 2007). 
9 “NARCO-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism--A Dangerous Mix,” Hearing 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, 
May 20, 2003.  
 4
al Qaeda.10  Gang activity has also been linked to terrorism.  Many of these gangs are 
populated by foreign-born individuals.  MS 13 is one example of a transnational gang 
whose members are predominantly foreign born.11  While there is no substantiated direct 
link between MS 13 and al Qaeda, these transnational gangs still represent a threat to our 
national security.12  Funding for terrorism would be disrupted with the increase in 
deportation of criminal aliens.  This disruption of funding could lead to the dissolution of 
terrorist networks. 
With the expansion of CAP, the criminal justice system can be used as a deterrent 
in a terrorism prevention strategy.  Certainty of removal from the United States after 
serving a criminal sentence is an effective and efficient weapon in the war on terror.  
Removal of criminal aliens must be seen as more than just the removal of a criminal 
element from society through enforcement of immigration laws.  It must be seen by 
national security strategists as essential to this Nations’ counterterrorism strategy. By 
processing someone through ICE’s databases, a removal would document their identities 
and thereby prevent any attempted legal reentry into the United States.   
Removing criminal aliens from the United States also removes a potential 
radicalized element from society.  Prisons are fertile ground for radicalization due to its 
isolating nature.  If these criminal aliens were removed from the United States prior to 
their release from prison, they would be unable to act upon any radical ideas gained in 
prison or spread these radical ideas to their ethnic communities within the United States.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines whether the removal of criminal aliens is an effective and 
efficient weapon in a terrorist prevention strategy, how ICE’s CAP can be expanded at 
the local and county level and the possible effects this expansion will have upon ICE in 
                                                 
10 “NARCO-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism--A Dangerous Mix,” Hearing 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, 
May 20, 2003, 3. 
11 Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration and 
the Alien Gang Epidemic: Problems and Solutions,” Statement before the House Committee on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, April 13, 2005, 2. 
12 Ibid., 5. 
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detaining and eventually removing criminal aliens.  In order to respond to this primary set 
of questions, this thesis also seeks to address the following secondary questions: 
• How do Homeland Security strategists view actual removal of criminal 
aliens in the strategy of terrorism prevention?  
• How receptive are local and county officials to the idea of screening their 
defendants and inmates regarding their immigration status and referring 
them to ICE for possible removal? 
• How can the use of incentives as well as training be used to influence the 
“buy in” of state and local officials to the expansion of the criminal alien 
program? 
• How can the number of illegal immigrants encountered at the local and 
county level justify expanding ICE’s criminal alien program or is any 
number of criminal aliens encountered sufficient? 
• How will ICE’s management of bed-space issues affect the expansion of 
ICE’s criminal alien program at the state and local level? 
• How can alternative solutions be used to alleviate ICE’s bed-space issues 
that would allow for the expansion of the criminal alien program at the 
state and local level? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Immigration in general is a hot-button topic that has resulted in a plethora of 
written material addressing a myriad of issues from a variety of perspectives.  Much has 
been written on the topic in general resulting in very polarized opinions being expressed.  
Those opinions range from advocating very restrictive immigration policies to advocating 
an open door immigration policy.  Throughout history, public opinion as well as those of 
politicians varies depending upon the health of the United States’ economy, current crime 
statistics, and perceived threats to national security.  Historically, public opinion 
influences political actions in enacting either permissive or restrictive immigration laws.   
This literature review focuses upon what has been written about criminal aliens 
over the last twelve years subsequent to congressional enactment of overhauling 
immigration legislation in 1996 that resulted in restrictive immigration consequences for 
criminal behavior.   
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1. Criminal Aliens and Their Rights under U.S. Immigration Law 
Immigration statutes and regulations provide the framework of laws that must be 
enforced by ICE.  As a component of the Department of Homeland Security, the assistant 
secretary of ICE has been delegated the authority to oversee the enforcement of these 
laws and regulations.  Historically, Congress has taken very seriously the threat that 
criminal aliens pose to the security of the United States.  With each statute enacted that 
effects immigration, the rights of criminal aliens have shrunk considerably.  A person 
who committed a crime in the United States could once get a second chance to stay in 
this country at the discretion of an Immigration Judge.  No longer is this the case.  
Congress eliminated most forms of discretionary relief for criminal aliens with the 
enactment of both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)13 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)14 in 1996.  
Indeed, once a person has committed an aggravated felony as defined under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act,15 a removal order from the United States is almost a 
certainty. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act was amended to include mandatory 
detention requirements for certain criminal aliens whereby aliens convicted of certain 
crimes cannot be released into the population after completion of their prison sentence.  
Rather, the Immigration and Nationality Act mandates that certain criminal aliens be 
detained by ICE pending resolution of their immigration status.16  The mandatory 
detention laws severely impacted how ICE conducted their daily operations.  Resources 
had to be redirected to manage the large number of criminal aliens now subject to 
mandatory detention. 
                                                 
13 U.S. Congress, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
14 U.S. Congress, The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
15 U.S. Congress, Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq. (2000). 
16 Ibid., § 236(c). 
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The sweeping changes enacted by Congress in 1996 had an incredibly adverse 
effect upon lawful permanent residents who committed crimes in the United States.  This 
across-the-board change meant that numerous lawful permanent residents, also known as 
green card holders, would be deported because of their crimes since they were no longer 
eligible for any form of discretionary relief that would permit them to remain in the 
country – something traditionally available to criminal lawful permanent residents prior 
to 1996.17  It also increased the number of criminal aliens ICE would have to remove 
from the United States. 
A CRS Report explores the history of immigration laws and the immigration 
consequences for the criminal alien.18  It attempts to take an objective and informative 
stance without arguing the benefits or the negatives of existing harsh laws.  Other 
scholarly sources question the constitutionality of our immigration laws and examine the 
real world ramifications of being a criminal alien.  Removal itself is often seen as a 
punishment linking it to the criminal justice system thus potentially making criminal 
aliens worthy of more rights and protection under the Constitution.19 
There also exist numerous sources that focus upon the enforcement of 





                                                 
17 Lawful permanent residents who committed crimes in the United States prior to 1996 were eligible 
for what’s commonly known as a 212(c) waiver. Ibid., § 212(c). In a 212(c) waiver hearing, an 
Immigration Judge determines whether the criminal alien would be permitted to remain in the United States 
by essentially weighing the good things about a person (length of residence, employment history, familial 
ties, etc.) against the bad things about a person (criminal history).  
18 Michael John Garcia and Larry M. Eig, “Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity,” CRS 
Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, October 23, 2006, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/75248.pdf (accessed November 2007). 
19 Daniel Kanstroom, “Deportation, Social Control and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why 
Harsh Laws Make Bad Cases,” Harvard Law Review 113, no. 8 (June 2000): 1890-1935. 
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in the Federal Lawyer.20  It discusses challenges faced by ICE in regard to detention 
space but focuses upon border issues more than criminal aliens.  It explores the DRO’s 
endgame strategy and the steps taken to achieve the endgame.21   
An article representative of the more liberal stance is a Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal article that examines the impact of AEDPA and IIRAIRA upon lawful 
permanent residents who commit crimes.22  It begins this exploration with a sympathetic 
tale of woe of a refugee from Afghanistan who came to the United States with his family 
at the age of three.  The article goes on to enumerate the equities the Afghani had in the 
United States that included parents diagnosed with cancer.  However, the American 
immigration laws left no room for discretion mandating that this lawful permanent 
resident be deported and separated from his family simply because he sold drugs in the 
United States.23 
Similarly, sympathetic stories of warrantless raids by ICE coupled with the 
apprehended individuals being detained at an out-of-state facility can be found 
throughout the literature.24  When ICE raids occur, immigrant rights are a predominant 
                                                 
20 Joseph Summerill, “Is Federal Immigration Detention Space Adequate? The Challenges Facing 
ICE’s Custody and Detention Management Efforts,” The Federal Lawyer, May 2007, 38, 
http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2007/summerill07a.pdf (accessed November 2007). 
21 Joseph Summerill, “Is Federal Immigration Detention Space Adequate? The Challenges Facing 
ICE’s Custody and Detention Management Efforts,” The Federal Lawyer, May 2007, 38, 
http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2007/summerill07a.pdf (accessed November 2007). 
22 Sara A. Rodriguez, “Exile and the Not-So-Permanent Legal Resident: Does International Law 
Require a Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen Convicted of Certain Crimes?,” 
Georgetown International Law Journal 20 (Spring 2006): 483. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Julia Preston, “No Need for a Warrant, You’re an Immigrant,” The New York Times, October 14, 
2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/weekinreview/14preston.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=119475393
5-HesktSibHqEX/Ct1oBgxbw (accessed November 2007). 
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theme in many articles.25  When mainstream media does focus on detaining immigrants, 
it most often focuses upon detaining illegal immigrants on the southern border.26 
2. ICE Resources 
While Congress enacted immigration statutes that provide the framework of how 
the government must handle criminal aliens, Congress did not provide the requisite 
resources to ensure successful implementation of these laws.  In other words, while the 
laws exist, resources such as bed-space and personnel needs remain a significant 
impediment to complying with congressional intent.  Indeed, a 2006 audit of ICE’s 
detention and removal of aliens by the Office of Inspector General found that mandatory 
detention limited DRO’s ability to detain aliens who pose a potential national security or 
public safety risk but do not necessarily qualify as mandatory detainees.27  It is estimated 
that “DRO would need an additional 34,653 detention beds with a projected cost of 1.1 
billion to detain and remove” all aliens from state sponsored terrorism countries (SST) or 
who originate from special interest countries (SIC) or countries that “promote, produce or 
protect terrorist organizations and their members” and CAP aliens.28 
The Office of Inspector General found that ICE is currently unable to remove 
physically from the U.S. all removable aliens – both criminals and non-criminals.29  
While ICE apprehends individuals, 36% of those individuals were released due to lack of 
personnel, bed-space and funding needed to detain them during their pending 
immigration proceedings.30  Indeed, this is not a new problem.  As early as 1996, the 
                                                 
25 Pam Belluck, “Lawyers Say U.S. Acted in Bad Faith after Immigrant Raid in Massachusetts,” The 
New York Times, March 22, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/washington/22mass.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed November 
2007). 
26 Rachel L. Swarns, “Plan Met with Warnings that it Won’t be Enough,” The New York Times, May 
16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/16/washington/16guard.html (access November 2007). 
27 “Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 
General, OIG-06-33, April 2006, 5. 
28 Ibid., 2. 
29 Ibid., 1. 
30 Ibid. 
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Office of Inspector General cited the shortage of detention bed-space as impacting the 
Department of Justice’s ability to physically remove aliens with final orders of removal.31 
To increase ICE’s ability to detain criminal aliens that are encountered, DRO has 
been piloting two programs that are alternatives to physical detention for non-criminal 
aliens and non-mandatory detention criminal aliens.  The Intensive Supervision 
Appearance Program (ISAP) has been piloted since June 2004 and involves an alien 
regularly checking in with ICE – similar to the parole system employed by the Bureau of 
Prisons.32  The Electronic Monitoring Device Program (EMD) has been piloted since 
May 2003 and employs the use of an ankle bracelet to monitor an alien’s whereabouts.33  
The Office of Inspector General has criticized DRO for the length of time it has taken to 
pilot these programs without developing recommendations for their implementation.34  
Currently, ICE implemented ISAP in twelve cities nationwide and implemented its 
Enhanced Supervision/Reporting (ESR) in 27 DRO offices.35  These are valid 
alternatives to simply releasing aliens into the U.S. population.  The ESR program 
provides the closest monitoring of aliens and, depending upon the type and security level 
of the detention facility, does not have the costs associated with a traditional detention 
facility. 
Several articles written by the Heritage Foundation discuss the problems of 
enforcement of immigration laws and offer of solutions.  A particularly interesting article 
advocates for the enforcement of current existing immigration laws without throwing  
 
 
                                                 
31 “Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 
General, OIG-06-33, April 2006, 3. 
32 Ibid., 25. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 ICE Fact Sheet, “Alternatives to Detention,” November 26, 2008, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080115alternativestodetention.htm?searchstring=alternatives%20A
ND%20detention (accessed December 2008). 
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further money at the problem.36  The problem of enforcement of those laws may require 
additional funds – Congress often enacts laws without great thought to the real world 
implications of its legislation. 
Another article by the Heritage Foundation explores the problems ICE encounters 
in housing mandatory detention aliens.37  It specifically states that the speed at which 
someone is deported must be addressed to decrease the need for bed-space.38  However, 
what this article fails to address is how to increase the speed at which someone is 
deported.   
Another topic that is extensively covered in the literature is government waste.  A 
New York Times article in 2002 was more concerned about government waste than the 
number of criminal aliens who are not identified and removed by Immigration 
authorities.39 
3. ICE’s Criminal Alien Program 
ICE’s Criminal Alien Program is a relatively new name for a compilation of 
several pre-existing programs under one umbrella program.  The Institutional Removal 
Program (IRP) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP) are all merged 
into CAP. 40  The expansion of CAP can be most effective in the realm of the former IRP.  
The IRP was a “national program that aims to: (1) identify removable criminal aliens in  
 
 
                                                 
36 James Jay Carafano, “Throwing Money at the Problem No Solution to Immigration and Border 
Security, The Heritage Foundation, June 15, 2007, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/wm1508.cfm (accessed November 2007). 
37 James Jay Carafano, “Safeguarding America’s Sovereignty: A System of Systems’ Approach to 
Border Security,” The Heritage Foundation, November 28, 2005, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1898.cfm (accessed November 2007).  
38 Ibid. 
39 Christopher Marquis, “Threats and Responses; Report Finds Lapses in Program to Deport Criminal 
Immigrants, The New York Times, October 8, 2002, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06EFD9103BF93BA35753C1A9649C8B63 (accessed 
November 2007). 
40 “Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 
General, OIG-06-33, April 2006, 14. 
 12
federal, state and local correctional facilities, (2) ensure that they are not released into the 
community, and (3) remove them from the United States upon completion of their 
sentences.”41 
The Office of Inspector General issued a report about the State Criminal Alien 
Assistance Program (SCAAP) that is directly linked to the possible expansion of ICE’s 
CAP.  SCAAP is a payment program whereby states and localities that have certain 
criminal aliens in their custody based on state or local charges and convictions are 
eligible to receive federal assistance.42  If county officials start identifying and tracking 
aliens in their custody, budgetary concerns might be alleviated with the receipt of 
SCAAP funds.  Additionally, local authorities who already receive SCAAP funds should 
be required to cooperate with ICE in removal efforts.43  It has even been suggested that 
these SCAAP funds be distributed on a graduated scale dependent upon the local 
authority’s cooperation with ICE.44 
With expanding local law enforcement’s role in identifying criminal aliens, there 
remains concern about ICE’s enforcement efforts impinging on civil rights.  An article in 
the Connecticut Law Review explores the blurring of the line between criminal aliens and 
threats to national security.45  It warns against knee-jerk reactions to illegal immigrants 
due to any alleged threat to national security.  It argues that removing criminal aliens will 
not cause a decrease in domestic crime nor will it deter further illegal immigration.  It 
also warns against the ever shrinking of civil liberties of immigrants in the United 
States.46 
                                                 
41 “Cooperation of SCAAP Recipients in the Removal of Criminal Aliens from the United States,” 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report 07-07 (redacted – public version), 
January 2007, 6. 
42 Ibid., i. 
43 Ibid., 7. 
44 Ibid., 9. 
45 Jennifer M. Chacon, “Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security,” Connecticut Law Review 39 (July 2007): 1827. 
46 Ibid. 
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This article conflates migrant workers, criminal aliens and terrorists.  In addition, 
the article is critical of the immigration laws enacted since 9/11 as not being effective in 
identifying and removing terrorists.47  In support of her argument, the author also places 
great weight upon the lack of non-citizens being removed from the United States on 
national security grounds.48  Finally, in attacking the removal of criminal aliens, the 
author argues that any threat to the United States is not removed simply by removing the 
alien from within this Nation’s borders.49   
A more conservative article that explores possible solutions regarding the removal 
of criminal aliens is found in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.50 It explores 
the numerous problems encountered when attempting to remove criminal aliens from 
management issues to funding issues.  The article advocates for a more cohesive 
approach that incorporates the aid of local law enforcement.  It advocates for state and 
local law enforcement to take an active role in the removal of criminal aliens without 
relying on actions by federal authorities.51 
When a high profile crime occurs involving an illegal alien or someone who 
should have been deported long ago, media attention focuses upon ICE’s failure to 
remove criminal aliens from the United States.  It also becomes newsworthy if a 
particularly scathing governmental report emerges concerning ICE’s ineffectiveness at 
removing criminal aliens.  Such was the case in 2006 when the New York Times 
published an extensive article concerning criminal aliens encountered by law 
enforcement at the local level.52  This article in particular documented the efforts of one 
local sheriff in reaching out to ICE officials to prevent criminal aliens from being simply 
released to the streets upon completion of their sentence.   
                                                 
47 Jennifer M. Chacon, “Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security,” Connecticut Law Review 39 (July 2007): 1858. 
48 Ibid., 1831, 1860. 
49 Ibid., 1875. 
50 Peter H. Shuck and John Williams, “Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of 
Federalism,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 22 (Spring 1999): 367. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Julia Preston, “New Scrutiny of Illegal Immigrants in Minor Crimes,” The New York Times, June 20, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/20/us/20jails.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed November 2007). 
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A high profile triple murder committed by illegal aliens in Newark caused much 
debate in the media concerning illegal immigrants and law enforcement.  Three college 
students were murdered execution style on a playground by illegal aliens – one of whom 
had previously been in the criminal justice system.53  That illegal alien should have never 
been released to the streets but instead been referred to ICE.  The Newark murders 
prompted the New Jersey Attorney General to issue guidelines regarding the mandatory 
referral to ICE of foreign-born individuals encountered by law enforcement in New 
Jersey.54   
D. ARGUMENT 
Removal of criminal aliens is an effective and efficient tool in a strategy to 
prevent terrorism.  ICE’s best opportunity to remove criminal aliens exists when they are 
serving their time in prison.  Accordingly, the CAP must be expanded to ensure ICE’s 
presence at all levels of criminal justice systems.  New procedures must be established 
that will necessitate cooperation between local, state and federal authorities.  Most 
importantly, in order to enforce the immigration laws to their fullest extent against 
criminal aliens, the “Catch and Release” policy55 must cease. 
Because additional criminal aliens will be detained and incarcerated with the 
expansion of CAP, the issue of limited bed-space must also be addressed.  There exist 
several possible strategies to circumvent bed-space issues and eliminate the “Catch and 
Release” policy.  First, ICE must attempt to resolve the criminal alien’s removal 
proceedings fully in Immigration Court prior to their release from incarceration.  Second, 
                                                 
53 Kareem Fahim, “Newark Triple Murder Fuels Debate on Treatment of Illegal Immigrants,” The 
New York Times, August 19, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/nyregion/19newark.html?n=Top/News/U.S./U.S.%States,%20Territories%20and
%20Posessions/New%20Jersey/Newark (accessed October 2008). 
54 Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2007-3, Anne Milgram, New Jersey Attorney 
General, August 22, 2007. 
55 ICE and legacy INS’ policy of “Catch and Release” referred to the common practice of releasing 
non-Mexican aliens encountered by ICE at Mexican border. This policy ceased in 2006 with the opening of 
a 500 bed ICE detention facility in Texas used to detain those encountered at the border. U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, “ICE Office of Detention and Removal,” News (November 2, 2006), 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/dro110206.htm (accessed November 2008). However, the policy of 
law enforcement encountering criminal aliens at the local level and releasing them can be seen as a new 
“Catch and Release” policy. 
 15
ICE should increase the use of Stipulated Removals and Administrative Removals to 
resolve a criminal alien’s immigration case by using motion papers and not a hearing 
before an Immigration Judge.  Stipulated Removals involve aliens who merely want to 
return to their home country; this is accomplished all on paper without a formal hearing.  
Administrative Removals do not involve a hearing before the Immigration Judge and can 
only be employed where the alien was not inspected or admitted into the United States 
and has been convicted of an aggravated felony.  Third, ICE should increase the use of 
incentives for aliens to accept final orders of removal such as getting out of jail early to 
be deported.  Fourth, the current procedure to obtain travel documents necessary to 
deport criminal aliens must be revamped so that it does not lengthen the time an alien 
remains in ICE’s custody.  Finally, alternatives to detention such as electronic monitoring 
must be employed against other non-mandatory detention aliens to make room in 
detention facilities for these criminal aliens. 
While recidivism rates are important for criminal aliens who are not identified and 
removed by ICE, it is equally important to realize that these criminal aliens provide an 
underlying network of crime that economically funds terrorism.  History is filled with 
examples of criminal activity financially supporting terrorism examples of which are 
explored in Chapter IV of this thesis. Moreover, these criminal aliens are ripe for 
radicalization in our prisons.  Admittedly, there are no known examples of criminal aliens 
becoming radicalized in prison going on to commit terrorist acts.  However, history 
provides examples of individuals being radicalized in the prison environment, regardless 
of their immigration status.  These examples are explored in Chapter III of this thesis.    
ICE’s CAP should expand beyond state and federal prisons to reach all county 
and local jail facilities throughout the United States.  This will entail streamlining the 
intake process of county and local prisoners such that foreign-born inmates are identified.  
Their staff will require training to develop standard intake questions for all inmates.  All 
incarcerated persons must be queried as to their place of birth and their citizenship.  
These officials should also be trained to compare the place of birth listed on the inmate’s 
arrest report, pre-sentence report and RAP sheet.  A specific query into the person’s 
immigration status would also be beneficial.   
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County and local officials must be given the contact information for the 
appropriate ICE office so that the given protocol is followed.  Once the foreign-born 
inmates are identified, a procedure must be established whereby ICE agents are given 
access to interview the inmates as soon as they enter the criminal justice system.  ICE 
must also be given access to official records within the files that can be used to establish 
a criminal alien’s removability.  County and local officials must be trained to abide by 
any ICE detainer that is lodged and to contact ICE prior to the release of these criminal 
aliens.   
The training of county and local officials will require an expenditure of funds that 
may not necessarily be available.  However, local officials’ cooperation with ICE may 
entitle them to receive funds under the SCAAP.56  Local officials may also be able to 
obtain training under the 287(g) provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.   
By referring cases to ICE, the actual removal of the criminal aliens who commit 
crimes will be accomplished.  Given the high rate of recidivism amongst criminal aliens, 
a corresponding decrease in the crime rate may result with the removal of these aliens.  A 
decreased crime rate also has the capacity to affect local budgetary concerns positively. 
ICE may encounter an increased demand for bed-space with the expansion of the 
CAP that may impact existing detention budgets.  Expansion of the CAP will not 
necessarily result in an increase demand for bed-space if certain actions are taken.  There 
are several strategies that can be employed to avoid the bed-space issue altogether or at 
least minimize the amount of time a criminal alien spends in ICE’s custody. 
1. Increase Immigration Court Hearings within the State and Local Jails 
Expansion of the CAP should also involve the expansion of Immigration Court 
hearings conducted while the inmate is incarcerated.  These criminal aliens are housed by 
another entity and do not become ICE’s bed-space problem until they have completed 
serving their sentence.  The complete resolution of a criminal alien’s immigration case 
prior to their release is an integral part of avoiding the creation of a bed-space problem.  
                                                 
56 This program is funded by the Department of Justice. 
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A criminal alien must be placed into removal proceedings as soon as the inmate is 
incarcerated.  This will maximize the amount of time the criminal alien spends in county 
and local custody to resolve the immigration hearing and any subsequent appeals. 
An increase in the IRP program will necessarily involve the Department of Justice 
and its Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) – the agency under which the 
Immigration Court lies.  EOIR’s budget may increase due to an increase in personnel 
needed to adjudicate all of the immigration cases under the new expanded CAP.  
However, existing personnel may be sufficient to handle the increased caseload.   
Expansion of the CAP to all county and local jails may also be met with 
opposition from local law enforcement.  Indeed, cities like San Francisco that consider 
themselves “sanctuary” cities have historically not cooperated with ICE’s efforts to 
identify and remove criminal aliens.57  Any opposition can be mitigated with proper 
education and training of local law enforcement.  While some cities may be more 
difficult than others, it must be brought to light that securing the homeland requires 
cooperation with ICE’s efforts to remove criminal aliens from the United States.   
2. Increase the use of Stipulated and Administrative Removals 
Stipulated removals are another way to ensure the complete resolution of a 
criminal alien’s immigration case prior to his release from custody.  Current practice 
requires a criminal alien’s actual appearance before an Immigration Judge regardless of 
whether the alien simply wants to accept an order of removal and return to his native 
country.  A stipulated removal would involve motion papers executed by the alien and 
submitted to the court.  In essence, the alien waives all of his rights and requests an order 
of removal.  A significant problem with this process is that aliens often do not have legal 
representation.  One could argue that the alien could be the subject of coercion and abuse.  
This could be minimized with training of the ICE agents to effectively communicate with  
 
 
                                                 
57 Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, “Cooperation of SCAAP Recipients in the 
Removal of Criminal Aliens from the United States,” Audit Report 07-07 (redacted – public version), 
January 2007, ix. 
 18
unrepresented aliens involved in the stipulated removal process. Additionally, ICE should 
also focus its efforts on educating EOIR on the steps it already takes to ensure that aliens 
who stipulate to removal do so voluntarily.   
Administrative removals are applicable to someone who entered the United States 
without inspection and has been convicted of an aggravated felony.58  Once placed into 
administrative removal proceedings, the alien is processed for removal without seeing an 
Immigration Judge unless they state a claim for asylum.59  As with stipulated removals, 
similar problems exist with the use of administrative removals.  Unrepresented aliens 
must be processed in a fair manner which can only be accomplished through an emphasis 
on training of ICE agents regarding effectively communicating with those who are 
unrepresented. 
3. Increase the Use of Incentives to Accept Final Orders of Removal 
ICE announced the concept of Rapid REPAT (Removal of Eligible Parolees 
Accepted for Transfer) in March 2008.60  The program allows for criminal aliens to be 
released from prison for the purposes of removal.  However, this program requires state 
cooperation to exist.  Currently only five states or territories are participating in such a 
program.   
Long before Rapid REPAT was launched, New York instituted a Conditional 
Parole for Deportation Only program (CPDO) that allows for the deportation of inmates 
with final orders of removal prior to the completion of their criminal sentence.61  Existing 
since 1986, a Parole Board in New York has the authority to grant parole to non-citizens 
convicted of a non-violent offense who have final orders of removal even prior to 
completion of the inmate’s minimum sentence.  Criminal aliens would have the incentive  
 
 
                                                 
58 Immigration and Nationality Act, §235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 
59 Ibid. 
60 ICE Rapid REPAT, Fact Sheet, March 26, 2008 
http://www.ice/gov/pi/news/factsheets/icerapidrepat.htm (accessed October 2008). 
61 N.Y. Exec. L. [section]259-I(2)(d)(McKinney 1993). 
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of getting out of prison early if they do not fight their immigration case and accept a final 
order of removal.  This ensures that the immigration case is resolved prior to their release 
from incarceration.  
Arizona’s program allowing for the parole and removal of state inmates has been 
in existence since 1996.  Entitled Release to Detainers/Deportation Orders, Arizona law 
allows for the release of foreign-born inmates upon completion of one-half of the 
imposed sentence.62  They must not have any prior felony or sexually based 
convictions.63 
ICE has saved substantial amounts through these programs because of decreased 
detention costs.  It estimates that it saves $812,000 per year in detention costs.64  
Additionally, both New York and Arizona save substantial sums with the reduction of 
housing inmates for the full duration of their sentence.  Between 1995 and 2007, New 
York State realized a $140,654,380 savings from decreased detention costs.65  Similarly, 
Arizona Department of Corrections saved $13,360,534 through the use of its parole for 
removal program.66   
In July 2008, ICE announced its first agreement under the Rapid REPAT 
initiative.  Puerto Rico’s Department of Correction and ICE entered into a partnership 
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removal purposes.67  It is estimated that this agreement will result in $2.5 million in 
annual savings.68  In August 2008, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections also 
signed an agreement under the Rapid REPAT program.69 
Procedurally, new laws may need to be implemented at the state level if laws 
similar to New York’s CPDO are not already in existence.  This might be met with 
significant opposition from victim’s rights groups or other groups interested in seeing 
convicted criminals serve their full time in prison.  The incentives to accepting a final 
order of removal would circumvent the sentence instituted by the trial court.  It also 
circumvents sentencing guidelines.  In a sense, it rewards the criminal by giving them a 
get out of jail free card just because they are an alien.  However, significant benefits are 
derived from this program – a decrease in litigation costs associated with litigating an 
immigration case, decrease in detention costs by the state involved and ICE, and physical 
removal of the alien from the United States. 
4. Travel Document Procedure Revisited 
An additional way to minimize the time an alien spends in ICE’s custody is to 
revamp DRO’s preparation of a criminal alien for deportation.  DRO does complete 
fingerprinting, photographing and other requisite documentation while the criminal alien 
is incarcerated.  However, most consulates and embassies require the alien to be in ICE’s 
custody with a final order of removal prior to issuing a travel document.  ICE’s 
implementation of the Electronic Travel Document system (eTD) has achieved 
tremendous success in obtaining travel documents within 24 hours for aliens from Central 
America.  However, this eTD system must be expanded to include other countries.  Ways 
to obtain travel documents prior to the criminal alien coming into ICE’s custody must 
                                                 
67 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, News Release, “ICE and Puerto Rico Department of 
Correction and Rehabilitation Partner to Remove Criminal Aliens and Save Tax Payers Millions of Dollars: 
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also be explored.  Additionally, the possibility of obtaining travel documents that do not 
have expiration dates must be fully examined.  Ideally, ICE should even know what flight 
the criminal alien will be placed on prior to coming into ICE’s custody. 
The major hurdle for DRO is the interview that is conducted by the consulates of 
the various countries from which the aliens claim citizenship.  Alternative ways to 
conduct these interviews prior to their release from prison must be explored.  
Teleconference equipment is available in most state and federal prisons.  If, however, it is 
not available at the local level, a cost/benefit analysis must be done. The cost of 
purchasing teleconference equipment for County and local officials must be compared 
with the cost of ICE housing these criminal aliens.  On the consulate end, the Department 
of State would have to reach out through diplomatic channels to see if teleconference 
interviews are feasible and whether they are a satisfactory way to conduct interviews 
necessary for the issuance of travel documents. 
Not only would teleconference interviews save a large amount of time that the 
criminal alien spends in ICE custody, it would also save the costs associated with 
transporting the alien to the consulate for an interview.  Security concerns as well as the 
manpower necessary to accomplish the actual transporting would be eliminated. 
There are several downsides that must be considered with this approach.  Initially, 
the actual teleconferencing equipment would have to be in place at the consulates prior to 
commencing a change in DRO procedure.  This will require coordination between ICE, 
Department of State and a large number of countries and their consulates.  The local 
prison facilities would also have to be willing to make the criminal aliens available for 
these teleconferences.  This will involve coordination between ICE and every prison and 
jail official.  While not impossible hurdles, they are hurdles nonetheless. 
5. Implement Alternatives to Detention 
DRO has been piloting two programs that are alternatives to physical detention.  
ISAP has been piloted since June 2004 and involves an alien regularly checking in with 
 22
ICE – similar to the parole system employed by the Bureau of Prisons.70  The EMD has 
been piloted since May 2003 and employs the use of an ankle bracelet to monitor an 
alien’s whereabouts.71  The Office of Inspector General has criticized DRO for the length 
of time it has taken to pilot these programs without developing recommendations for their 
implementation.72  These are both valid alternatives to simply releasing aliens into the 
U.S. population.   
While these alternatives to detention would not be available to criminal aliens 
because of the mandatory detention regulations, they would allow for the release of non-
mandatory detention aliens.  This would free-up available bed-space so that ICE could 
house criminal aliens.   
The expansion of the CAP to encompass all county and local jails nationwide 
takes full advantage of the incarceration of criminal aliens.  It takes aim at ensuring that 
criminal aliens are not released back into the U.S. population.  The expansion of CAP 
will necessarily involve bed-space issues.  Given the five possible strategies to alleviate 
the issue of bed-space set forth above, bed-space should not be an impediment to the 
expansion of CAP under ICE’s Secure Communities. 
Currently, between eight and ten percent of the U.S. prison population are 
foreign-born aliens.  The removal of these criminal aliens will reduce crime rates, will 
reduce the costs associated with prosecuting and detaining these individuals, will 
decrease underlying funding of terrorism, and decrease the likelihood of potentially 
radicalized individuals from acting out on radical ideas.  Criminal aliens are there for 
ICE’s taking sitting in jails across the nation.  They should not be released back into the 
U.S. population at the end of their sentence merely because ICE has no relationship with 
local law enforcement. 
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E.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will add to the national discussion of illegal aliens present in the 
United States and their connection to the war on terror.  Currently, most of the debate 
concerns hardening our borders to prevent further illegal immigrants from entering the 
country.  This national immigration debate also focuses on a possible amnesty for those 
already present in the United States.  The need to address those aliens disobeying the 
criminal laws of this Nation at every level of the criminal justice system as well as 
possible solutions to existing issues preventing their swift detention and removal is 
examined.  This thesis points to the need to develop consistent policies regarding 
identifying criminal aliens designed to foster relationships between ICE and local law 
enforcement.  Policy decisions with the focus upon providing a cohesive homeland 
security policy to combat the real threat of criminal aliens in the United States are 
discussed.  The outcome of this research demonstrates the need to manage criminal aliens 
effectively and efficiently to advance homeland security objectives. 
F.   METHODOLOGY 
Interviews focused on the use of removal of criminal aliens as a part of a broader 
strategic counterterrorism plan.  Individuals from the Joint Terrorism Task Force and 
New York City Police Department’s Shield were interviewed concerning whether the 
effective and efficient removal of criminal aliens is an effective tool in the war on terror.   
In researching this thesis of expansion of ICE’s CAP and the issues that arise 
from such expansion, structured formal interviews were conducted of a representative 
mix of ICE field officials varying in size and physical location in the United States.  
Specifically, ICE Field Office Directors and Assistant Field Office Directors from DRO 
who are directly involved with the daily operations of CAP were interviewed.  These 
individuals are located in field offices throughout the country.   
From these interviews, this thesis considers whether there is a consensus as to the 
need for the expansion of the CAP to the local and county levels.  It also explores how 
this can best be accomplished as a collaborative effort with the local law enforcement 
community.  These interviews examine whether there exists an ideal program or 
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programs already in use that could be implemented nationwide.  Identifying the possible 
problems associated with any expansion of CAP at the local and county level were also 
be explored during the interview.  Once the problems are identified, possible solutions 
are discussed.   
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II. ICE’S CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 
A. BACKGROUND 
With the enactment in 1996 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), 
Congress expressed its clear intent to remove criminal aliens from the United States.  
These laws severely limit the relief from removal available to criminal aliens.  
Accordingly, depending upon the seriousness of the crime committed, an alien often has 
no relief from removal and should be physically removed from the United States. 
Congress also enacted mandatory detention requirements for certain criminal 
aliens whereby aliens convicted of certain crimes cannot be released into the population 
after completion of their sentence.  Rather, they must be detained pending resolution of 
their immigration status.73  An alien subjected to mandatory detention is entitled to a 
hearing before the Immigration Court.  This Court either resolves the criminal alien’s 
status in the U.S. allowing them to stay in the country or orders them removed.  The 
process before the Immigration Court, however, is itself often lengthy and may often 
involve appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals or litigation before the federal 
circuit courts. 
Mandatory detention alone requires ICE to detain an enormous amount of 
criminal aliens.  However, Congress did not provide the requisite resources to ensure 
successful implementation of these laws.74  In other words, while the laws exist, 
resources such as bed-space and personnel needs remain a significant impediment to 
complying with congressional intent.  Indeed, a 2006 audit of ICE by the Office of 
Inspector General found that mandatory detention limited DRO’s ability to detain aliens 
who pose a potential national security or public safety risk but do not necessarily qualify 
                                                 
73 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
1101, et seq. (2000), INA Section 236(c).  
74 Congress has been generous in recent budget allocations specifically in reference to ICE’s Secure 
Communities initiative. 
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as mandatory detainees.75  It is estimated that DRO would need almost an additional 
35,000 detention beds at an approximate cost of 1.1 billion to detain and remove all 
aliens from state sponsored terrorism countries (SST) or who originate from special 
interest countries (SIC) or countries that “promote, produce or protect terrorist 
organizations and their members” and CAP aliens.76 ICE operates eight detention 
facilities called Service Processing Centers (SPCs) throughout the U.S.77  An additional 
seven facilities are run by government contractors.78  A GAO study found that the federal 
government spent approximately $5.8 billion to incarcerate criminal aliens from 2001-
2004.79  Nonetheless, even with all of this money being spent, there still remain bed-
space issues that directly impact ICE’s ability to do its job. 
ICE is currently unable to remove physically from the U.S. all removable aliens – 
both criminals and non-criminals.80  While ICE apprehends individuals, 36% of those 
individuals were released due to lack of personnel, bed-space and funding needed to 
detain them during their pending immigration proceedings.81  According to an audit 
conducted by the Office of Inspector General in 2006, ICE “does not have the resources 
to identify, detain and remove these aliens under its Criminal Alien Program.”82  As early 
as 1996, the Office of Inspector General discussed the shortage of detention bed-space as 
impacting the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service’s ability to physically 
remove aliens with final orders of removal.83  While ICE has made great improvements 
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in its ability to remove criminal aliens, much room for improvement still exists - 
improvements that do not necessarily entail the expenditure of billions of dollars. 
B. THE CREATION OF ICE’S CAP  
ICE’s CAP is a relatively new name for a compilation of several pre-existing 
programs under one umbrella program.  One component of CAP is the former 
Institutional Removal Program (IRP) which was a “national program that aims to: (1) 
identify removable criminal aliens in federal, state and local correctional facilities, (2) 
ensure that they are not released into the community, and (3) remove them from the 
United States upon completion of their sentences.”84 The IRP and the Alien Criminal 
Apprehension Program (ACAP), are all merged into CAP.85  ICE’s DRO took over the 
management of CAP in June 2007.86   
The screening and processing of criminal aliens within the Bureau of Prisons was 
centralized through the deployment in June 2006 of the Detention Enforcement and 
Processing Offenders by Remote Technology (DEPORT).87  DEPORT screens all federal 
inmates often through video teleconferencing (VTC) equipment.88  Shared databases are 
also used to track information concerning inmates who are possibly amenable to removal 
proceedings.89   
Currently, ICE’s CAP does not reach every jail at the local and county level 
across the United States.  It conducts screening at 100% of the state and federal prisons  
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across the United States.90  In contrast, ICE only screens about 10% of the 3,100 jails 
across the nation.91  Even with limited screening at the local level, ICE identified over 
164,000 criminal aliens in fiscal year 2007.92    
ICE intends to enhance its CAP over several years through its Secure 
Communities plan in several ways.  In addition to enhancing interoperability of databases 
at the booking process for all local law enforcement, ICE will reach out to other vested 
stakeholders.  ICE will work with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 
and local law enforcement facilities to expand the use of teleconferencing capabilities.93  
ICE also intends to work with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to increase the number of 
prosecutions of criminal aliens who illegally re-enter the country.94  It intends to expand 
its Alternatives to Detention Program (ATD) and its Rapid REPAT (Removal of Eligible 
Parolees Accepted for Transfer) program.95  To enhance interactions with local law 
enforcement, it intends to provide 24/7 operational coverage and expand its 287(g) 
program.96   
C. NEW YORK’S CAP  
In 1990, Congress mandated that deportation proceedings be completed, 
whenever possible, against aggravated felons prior to their release from criminal 
detention.97  However, even prior to this Congressional mandate, legacy Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) in cooperation with New York’s Department of Correctional  
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Services (NYDOCS) commenced the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)98 in 1986.  
The purpose of the program was and is to complete deportation proceedings prior to an 
inmate’s release from NYDOCS’ custody.99   
NYDOCS allows the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an 
agency within the Department of Justice, to have space within its prison facility for a 
courtroom in which to conduct deportation hearings.  However, the nature of this state 
and federal government endeavor and their working relationship has been less than 
smooth.  Indeed, in 1993, New York State sued in federal District Court to make the 
federal government commence deportation proceedings against their inmates.100  The suit 
centered on INS’ failure to take into custody aliens who were on various release 
programs through New York State.  While the suit was eventually dismissed by the 
District Court for lack of jurisdiction, it does highlight what can happen with a 
breakdown in communication even when both sides are working toward a common goal.   
In 1994, after the dismissal of the lawsuit, NYDOCS and the Justice Department 
arranged to streamline the intake process for the IHP through three distinct prisons – one 
a maximum-security prison, one a medium security prison and one a female maximum-
security prison.101  All inmates would come through one of these three facilities upon 
their initial entry into the prison system.  After that streamlining process commenced, 
INS agents were stationed at or regularly visited these prisons to interview inmates 
flagged by state officials as foreign-born during their prison intake screening.  Every 
foreign-born inmate who entered NYDOCS from then on would be interviewed by an 
INS agent.102 
The list of foreign-born inmates generated by NYDOCS is then given to ICE.  
ICE then runs these inmates through a variety of databases to see if an immigration 
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record already exists for a particular inmate.  The ICE officers then provide NYDOCS 
with a list of inmates that need to be interviewed.  During the interview process, alienage 
and citizenship are determined.  In other words, an inmate confirms their place of birth 
and the fact that they are not U.S. citizens; they also confirm whether they are present in 
the U.S. legally or illegally.  Place and manner of entry into the United States is also 
queried.  They are asked to sign an affidavit summarizing the interview, which can later 
be used as evidence in Immigration Court.   
To establish removability based upon their criminal conviction, ICE receives the 
inmate’s criminal records through official NYDOCS records.  These certified records can 
then be used as evidence in Immigration Court.  This cooperation with NYDOCS saves 
ICE significant resources in not having to retrieve certified records of the conviction from 
the criminal court.   
A detainer is given to the prison and follows the inmate to any prison facility to 
which the inmate is transferred.  This detainer is placed in the inmate’s records and 
advises the prison of ICE’s interest in taking the inmate into custody.  Prison officials are 
not to release the inmate without informing ICE.   
Once alienage and removability have been established, a “Notice to Appear” is 
served upon the criminal alien and the Immigration Court setting forth the reasons the 
government believes the alien should be removed from the United States.  The alien is 
either physically brought to the Immigration Court or appears via teleconferencing.  
NYDOCS’ use of this televideo equipment saves thousands of dollars in transport costs.  
It also eliminates the security hazards associated with transporting a criminal. 
The alien is given their rights in Immigration Court and given an opportunity to 
obtain counsel.  They are advised of any relief from removal for which they may be 
eligible to apply.  Often, no relief is available to them due to the serious nature of the 
crime for which they are incarcerated.  At the conclusion of their immigration hearing, 
they are either granted some sort of relief from removal and allowed to remain in the 
United States or they are given an Order of Removal.  If they are allowed to remain, the 
immigration detainer is lifted as ICE can no longer remove them from the United States.  
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They will be released at the end of their prison sentence.  If, however, their case is still 
pending or they have been ordered removed, NYDOCS notifies ICE approximately thirty 
days prior to the inmate’s release.  He is then transferred from the custody of NYDOCS 
to the custody of ICE.   
Once an individual is transferred to ICE custody, ICE next determines a location 
that is appropriate for the inmate.  If the immigration hearing remains unresolved, the 
inmate is transferred to an ICE detention facility with an immigration court.  In New 
York, if the inmate has a final order of removal, he is transferred to one designated ICE 
detention facility in upstate New York to be processed for removal.  This involves getting 
the appropriate paperwork and travel documents from the inmate’s home country to 
effect actual removal.  Depending upon the specific country and the particular ICE field 
office involved, this can range from a couple of days to two weeks or be as long as 90 
days.  Where an alien has a final order of removal and the appropriate travel documents, a 
flight is arranged and the alien is physically removed from the United States. 
Some countries, however, do not comply with the issuance of travel 
documents.103  There are also other countries to which the United States cannot deport 
even its worst criminal aliens; Cuba is at the top of this list.  If ICE cannot obtain travel 
documents or cannot effect the removal of the criminal alien within a “reasonable” 
amount of time, this alien must be released from ICE custody after approximately 180 
days.104  
If the alien does not have a final order of removal, they are transferred to an ICE 
detention facility that has the requisite bed space.  They will be detained at this facility 
until resolution of their immigration case.  While immigration hearings and appeals are 
expedited for those who are detained, an alien still may spend weeks or months in ICE’s 
custody.   
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D. SECURE COMMUNITIES 
In March 2008, ICE announced the launching of its Secure Communities 
initiative.105  Secure Communities seeks to expand ICE’s criminal alien program to all of 
the jails and prisons throughout the United States.106  It seeks to identify, detain and 
remove all of the aliens encountered by law enforcement.107  While the strategic plan for 
this initiative is still being developed, the core concepts remain.   
Recognizing the existence of significant gaps in ICE’s current CAP, Secure 
Communities seeks to bring together vested stakeholders through outreach and 
technology integration.  It adopts a risk based approach to identifying and processing 
criminal aliens setting forth three levels of criminal offenders – level 1 being the most 
serious felonies.108  ICE is exploring technology solutions to integrate booking data so 
that ICE can prioritize its resources to the most serious offenders.109 
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III. PRISONER RADICALIZATION 
Two key processes pave the way towards actual terrorism: radicalization 
and recruitment.  Radicalisation is a social process, while recruitment is a 
form of ‘direction’ that taps into radicalization and seeks to channel it in 
the direction of violence.110 
In its war on terror, the United States faces threats from those both inside and 
outside of its borders.  While improvements have been made to harden our borders, a 
significant threat exists from what already lies within our imprisoned population.  
Prisoner radicalization is a serious threat that contains the greatest potential for the 
creation of a “homegrown terrorist.”  Prisons provide an ideal environment for both 
recruitment and radicalization of a potential terrorist. 
A. THE INDIVIDUAL 
Much has been written about the conditions or situations that can make an 
individual become a terrorist.  Likewise, much has been written about the characteristics 
of the individual that make them susceptible to radical terrorist ideas.  If one could 
identify situational conditions that are conducive to the creation of a terrorist as well as 
recognize individuals with the enumerated traits, then we are better able to identify and 
monitor those conditions.  However, much of the literature about terrorists derives its 
information from secondary sources rather than directly from the terrorist themselves.111 
Without talking directly to terrorists, past behaviors of individuals who are known 
terrorists can be examined. Those seeking to recruit individuals into a terrorist 
organization seek out specific types of individuals.  When seeking out these individuals, 
“part of the challenge facing those who seek to instigate rebellion and revolution is to fire 
the imagination of the disadvantaged, so that they find it easier to believe that under fairer 
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conditions their collective lives would have been much better.”112  U.S. prisons are filled 
with those who believe themselves disadvantaged and subject to unfair conditions.  
Prisoners themselves are vulnerable to extremist views because of the nature of their 
situation.  Those that feel discriminated against or who feel oppressed as a minority are 
ripe for recruitment.113 
Imprisonment itself “may increase a prisoner’s susceptibility to adopting 
radicalized ideas or beliefs.”114  Importance has been placed upon how an individual 
subjectively feels about their particular situation relative to others.115  How an individual 
is treated and valued relative to others impacts these subjective beliefs.116  
Social identity theory recognizes the individual’s need and desire to belong to a 
group to help define their distinct identity.117  The self concept of individuals stems in 
large part from ones membership in certain groups.118  Where an individual is satisfied 
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individual sees their social identity as a member of a disadvantaged group, they often 
compare themselves to those they consider more privileged relative to their deprived state 
and make demands for better treatment.120 
“Social identity” has been defined to mean an individual’s self-concept deriving 
from their knowledge of membership in a social group in conjunction with one’s imposed 
significance of that membership.121  Stereotypes relate directly to social identity theory.  
Stereotypes are “beliefs that all members of a particular group have the same qualities, 
which circumscribe the group and differentiate it from other groups.”122  These social 
psychology theories are instrumental when examining an individual who finds 
themselves within a prison environment. 
B. THE PRISON ENVIRONMENT 
The prison environment isolates the individual from society at large but in so 
doing creates its own society - a society with strict rules and regulations where freedoms 
are severely restricted and almost non-existent.  Hostility toward prison authorities is 
often bred from this restrictive and arbitrary environment.123  The inmates are often cut 
off from family and friends due to the physical location of their housing facility within a 
state’s prison system.  Practically speaking, not everyone can be incarcerated near their 
hometown but instead are transferred to a facility, which is often hours from their home 
in a place that provides no public transportation for relatives desiring to visit.  This loss 
of the family and friend support systems can cause psychological stress and a feeling of 
isolation.124 
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The prison system itself strips the individual of what society uses to define the 
individual.  Personal possessions and individualized clothing are replaced with a uniform 
and a barren cell devoid of any identifying traits other than its own number.  All forms of 
privacy are eliminated in the name of security such that showers and toilets are subject to 
public scrutiny.  The prisoners are assigned numbers that are used to identify them rather 
than their given names.  These numbers will follow them no matter where they are 
transferred in a state’s prison system.  That number becomes their new identity.   
The process of conditioning to prison life is dehumanizing and designed such that 
the prisoners surrender control of every aspect of the lives.125  In so doing, it often 
exacerbates an inmate’s existing anti-social tendencies.126  Prisoners often join or form 
groups to establish a sense of identity – whether it be religious based groups, race based 
groups or gang related groups.127  Assimilating into their new environment and culture 
has been described as “prisonization.”128  The inmate adopts the customs and behavior 
found within the prison community.129  In a 2008 RAND report, it was found that: 
Prisoners’ differential ability to cope and integrate in to the prison 
community is influenced by a range of individual, group and institutional 
variables, including their physical and mental health, their substance 
dependency, their personal relationships, their group memberships and 
affiliations, their attitudes, norms and believe systems, their ability to form 
new relationships and affiliations, and the composition of groups and 
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Indeed, an otherwise normal individual can be dramatically influenced by the 
environment found in prison.  Psychological studies from the 1960s demonstrate that it is 
not necessarily a “bad apple” that will determine future behavior so much as it is a “bad 
barrel.”131 
C. PRISON RADICALIZATION 
Radicalization has been described as “a search for identity in a moment of 
crisis.”132  The process of radicalization involves a “cognitive opening, a moment when 
previous explanations and belief systems are found to be inadequate in explaining an 
individual’s experience.”133  In the prison context, radicalization “refers to the process by 
which inmates . . . adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to 
be taken for political or religious purposes.”134   
The process of radicalization can be compared to “similarity attraction.”  
Individuals are attracted to organizations that are similar to themselves.  The organization 
also has the ability to make choices depending upon the attractiveness of the individual.  
Once the individual is part of the organization, they become socialized and even more 
assimilated to the norms within the organization.135 
Applied in a prison environment, the “similarity attraction” results in vulnerable 
prisoners being lured by the attractiveness of radical ideals.  These radical ideals reach 
prisoners through a variety of means but primarily through anti-U.S. information 
disseminated by religious providers, other radicalized inmates or extremist literature.136  
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The prisoner who is vulnerable to these radical ideals espoused by charismatic leaders is 
one who has suffered perceived injustices of society and seeks an outlet for the anger he 
feels toward society.137 
The prison environment provides the perfect environment for radicalization.  
Individuals who are thrown into a new environment behind bars often feel rejected by 
society and struggle to identify themselves.  This identity struggle leads to a seeking out 
of new ideals and beliefs.  A new identity is often formed with the joining and 
assimilating into a group.138  It is the type of group that is formed while in prison that is 
of greatest concern.  The fact remains however that the prison environment is ideal for 
the creation of radicalized individuals and deserves close scrutiny by law enforcement 
and intelligence officials.   
By no means does every prisoner go on to become a terrorist.  Indeed, there are 
those who constructively use the prison environment.  Religion itself can be a motivating 
factor for positive change.  Individuals who convert to Islam or any other religion often 
lead a disciplined and law abiding life outside of prison.  It is the radical form of any 
religion to which some prisoners can become susceptible in the prison environment. 
D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF RADICALIZED PRISONERS 
History is filled with examples of prisoners who became radicalized while in 
prison.  The prison environment that exists throughout the world has been fertile grounds 
for the furtherance of radical ideas – an incubator for extremism. 139  Likewise, it has also 
provided the opportunity for like-minded individuals to connect with one another and 
further their cause.  Since ideology is the lifeblood of a terrorist movement, a new cell 
has the potential to arise behind prison walls.140   
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A 2008 RAND study explored a variety of groups and their use of the prison 
environment to further their respective cause.141  From the IRA to the Suffragettes to the 
Aryan Nation, imprisonment has been used as an opportunity to recruit members and 
network with like-minded others within this captive environment.  This phenomenon is 
pervasive in prisons throughout the world.   
Some more recent examples of prison radicalization include the case of Jeff Fort 
and his involvement with El Rukn.  Fort converted to Islam and instructed his followers 
while incarcerated in the brokering of a deal with the Libyan government in 1985 to carry 
out attacks on U.S. police and military targets in exchange for 2.5 million dollars.142  In 
1987, Fort and six others were convicted and sentenced to 80 years incarceration.143 
While incarcerated, James Ellison, founder of the Covenant Sword and Arm of 
the Lord (CSA) met Robert G. Miller who went on to become Ellison’s spiritual advisor 
in prison.144  After their release from prison, this extremist Christian group recruited 
others to join their compound where they made landmines and stored a large supply of 
cyanide intended to be used to poison a city’s water supply.145  In 1985, Ellison was 
convicted of federal racketeering and weapons charges and sentenced to 20 years 
incarceration.146 
Another example of radical leaders thriving in prison is the case of Sheik Omar 
Abdel Rahman, the blind cleric and emir of Egypt’s Gama’at al Islamia who was 
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incarcerated for his role as mastermind of the 1993 plot to blow up New York City 
landmarks.  The blind sheik issued a decree from prison stating that “Muslims 
everywhere [should] dismember their nation, tear them apart, ruin their economy, 
provoke their corporations, destroy their embassies, attack their interests, sink their ships, 
. . . shoot down their planes, [and] kill them on land, at sea, and in the air.  Kill them 
wherever you find them.”147 
There have been numerous instances of radicalized prisoners since September 11, 
2001.  The infamous shoe bomber, Richard Reid, was radicalized while incarcerated for 
petty crime in the United Kingdom’s Feltham Young Offenders Institution.148  Reid’s 
radicalization was further developed upon his release from prison with sermons by 
radical clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri at the same mosque attended by Zacarias 
Moussaoui, convicted 9/11 terrorist.149  He was convicted in 2003 of one count of 
attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against United States nationals outside the 
United States and two counts of interference with a flight crew by use of a dangerous 
weapon and sentenced to life in prison.150   
Similarly, the leader of the attempted bombing of London’s subway and bus 
system in July 2005, Muktar Said Ibrahim, was incarcerated for five years at the same 
prison as Richard Reid, Feltham Young Offenders Institution, after a conviction for a 
gang related offense.151  Ibrahim converted to Islam while incarcerated and went on to 
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become radicalized at the same mosque as Reid and Moussaoui.152  He was convicted in 
July 2007 of conspiracy to murder for his role in the London attacks, sentenced to life in 
prison and is currently appealing his conviction.153  Ibrahim was born and raised in 
Eritrea and eventually immigrated to the United Kingdom.154  He later gained UK 
citizenship.155  Ibrahim’s convictions for robbery which occurred prior to his gaining 
citizenship in the UK rendered him a criminal alien in the United Kingdom.  It remains 
unclear if these early criminal convictions would have made him removable under the 
laws of the United Kingdom or whether these convictions were brought to the attention of 
the immigration authorities prior to his gaining citizenship and prior to his involvement in 
the London subway attacks.   
Yet another example of prison radicalization lies in the formation of and 
recruitment of members to the terrorist organization Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh (JIS) by 
founder Kevin James while incarcerated in California state prison.  While imprisoned, 
James formed JIS and recruited Levar Haley Washington to join his cause.156  Together 
they plotted to attack U.S. military operations and Jewish facilities in the Los Angeles 
area.157  The two pled guilty in 2007 to conspiring to wage war against the United 
States.158 
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Al Qaeda continues to seek to have its message reach those currently imprisoned.  
Indeed, extremist translations of the Qur’an have been distributed to prisoners.159  
Radical Islamic views are being preached at a majority of prisons in France.160  Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi, an imprisoned Al Qaeda leader, continues his recruitment of 
other imprisoned individuals through his writings.  In one article, al-Maqdisi calls on 
those imprisoned to use imprisonment as an opportunity for “obeying God, worshipping 
him, memorizing the Quran, seeking and spreading Da’wah and learning from the 
experience of those around him to become stronger for jihad.”161 
E. EXPANSION OF CAP AND RADICALIZED PRISONERS  
At least one extremist group is known to have maintained a database with 
information regarding prisoners they deemed potential recruits.162  Prisoner names, 
release dates and addresses to be used upon release were maintained by al Haramain for 
over 15,000 prisoners.163  
With ICE’s Secure Communities initiative, criminal aliens who have potentially 
been exposed to radical ideas will no longer pose a threat to the community upon their 
release from prison.  These individuals will be detained by ICE and eventually deported 
to their native country.  The threat of radicalized prisoners who are criminal aliens has 
effectively been neutralized.   
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IV. FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
While terrorists obtain funding from a variety of sources, criminal activity 
significantly contributes to a terrorist group’s financial abilities.  Accordingly, 
identifying, detaining, and removing criminal aliens from the United States may 
significantly impact terrorists’ ability to obtain financing while increasing law 
enforcement’s effectiveness in the war on terror.   
A simple fact in the war on terror is that terrorists need money to carry out their 
objectives.  It is needed to maintain the broad infrastructure of their organization to plan 
and execute future attacks.164  Money has been described as central to counterterrorism 
strategies.165  Law enforcement’s ability to disrupt the flow of financing to terrorist 
organizations is integral to disrupting the effectiveness of terrorist organizations.166  The 
disruption of terrorist financing can be a useful intelligence tool and can lead to the 
uncovering of previously unknown links between terrorist operatives.167  Indeed, law 
enforcement’s investigation of terrorist financing has disrupted at least four terrorist 
attacks.168  Efforts continue around the globe to combat terrorism financing.169 
The financing of terrorism has a variety of sources including legitimate sources 
such as donations from charitable organizations to state sponsored terrorism to criminal 
enterprise.  The use of criminal activity to fund terrorist activities varies from low level 
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fraud to organized crime.170  Arms, drug and human trafficking have all been linked to 
terrorism.171  Additionally, criminal activities involving counterfeit goods and contraband 
cigarettes have also supported terrorist group activities.172  Illegal cigarette smuggling 
alone has been linked to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and al 
Qaeda.173  In 2006, the Department of Justice indicted 19 men on charges of participating 
in black market cigarette sales linked to the funding of Hezbollah.174  The “Lackawanna 
Seven” received funding from an individual who was convicted of conspiracy commit 
money laundering and contraband cigarette smuggling.175 
Intellectual property crimes have also been a source of significant funding for 
terrorists.  The trafficking and sale of counterfeit goods, whether it is a fake designer 
purse or a copied CD or DVD, is an emerging threat.176  There is low risk associated with 
this type of crime with a high return on investment.177 
In addition, drug trafficking continues to be an incredibly lucrative source of 
funding for terrorist organizations.  In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in May 2003, Mr. Steven McGraw, the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) Office of Intelligence stated that “international drug trafficking is a 
highly lucrative enterprise generating billions of dollars in profit that terror groups can 
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easily tap into, and that most if not all terror groups obtain financing from drug 
trafficking.”178  In 2006-07, the Department of State’s International Control Strategy 
Report (INCSR) reported that in the tri-border region of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil 
alone, tens of millions of dollars are laundered and support terrorism in the region.179  Of 
greatest significance, nearly one third of the organizations on the Justice Department’s 
list of major trafficking groups responsible for the U.S. drug supply also appear on the 
State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2002.180  There remains a 
concern about the nexus between trafficking of narcotics and terrorism and the possible 
use of drug smuggling paths for smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United 
States.181  
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON FINANCING OF TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Terrorist organizations throughout history have at least one thing in common - the 
need for funds to keep their organization running.  Almost all terrorist organizations have 
links to criminal activities.  While the topic of terrorist financing is too broad to be fully 
discussed in this thesis, below are just a few examples of terrorist organizations and the 
link between criminal endeavors and the financing of their activities.   
In the 1970s, the IRA funded its operations through a variety of criminal 
activities, which included robberies, kidnappings, extortion and illegal drinking clubs.182  
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In the 1980s, the IRA changed its method of financing by abandoning activities deemed 
too risky for the financial return and too costly when considering public displeasure.183 
Likewise, Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) also turned to criminal 
enterprise to fund its activities.  In addition to a revolutionary tax that was imposed in the 
Basque region,184 ETA relied upon robberies and kidnappings to fund their operations.185  
Following the IRA’s example, ETA also stopped criminal activities that were too violent 
or deemed too risky for the financial gain.186   
Two major Colombian terrorist groups derive their funding from trafficking in 
cocaine.  Both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United 
Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) receive more than half of their funding through 
cocaine production, taxation and trafficking.187  Formed in 1965, the FARC currently 
raises $200 - 300 million annually through the illegal drug trade.188  The FARC also 
raises funds through kidnapping and extortion schemes.189   
The French authorities discovered in 1996 that a series of armed robberies were 
perpetrated by the Roubaix gang, a small Islamic militant group.190  This group had also 
committed robberies in Bosnia to fund the jihad.191  While most of the members of the  
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Roubaix gang were killed in shoot-outs with police, a co-leader of this organization 
Lionel Dumont was sentenced to 30 years in prison in December 2005 for his role in the 
1996 armed robberies.192 
Similarly, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) received funding from 
trafficking in drugs, arms, stolen vehicles and forged documents.193  GIA’s members 
continue to fund its activities through its criminal activities.194  Through these criminal 
financing efforts, one member, Fateh Kamel, developed links to al Qaeda and the 
millennium bomber.195 
Hezbollah has raised significant funds through their criminal activities.  Through 
Operation Smokescreen, in 2000 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
uncovered a cigarette smuggling ring that bought cigarettes in states with low tax only to 
resell them in states with a higher tax with profits again being given to Hezbollah.196  In 
2002, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s Operation Mountain Express uncovered a 
drug ring that smuggled pseudoephedrine, the main ingredient in methamphetamine, from 
Canada into the Midwest with proceeds being funneled to Hezbollah.197   
There are numerous examples of groups obtaining funding predominantly from 
drug trafficking.  Afghanistan’s former Taliban regime financed itself through local  
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opium and heroin trade.198  Additionally, the Kosovo Liberation Army received a large 
portion of their funds through drug trafficking.199  The Kurdistan Workers Party also was 
dependent upon drug trafficking as a source of revenue.200 
While al Qaeda itself financed the 9/11 attacks with donations from various 
sources which include charities and private donors,201 the government of the United 
States has not determined precisely how al Qaeda raises its funds or how they are 
distributed.202  Charitable organizations however now face increased pressure regarding 
any possible funding of terrorist groups.203  The Jamestown Foundation found that due to 
this increase of pressure, criminal activities including drug trafficking and robbery are 
quickly becoming a primary source of terrorism funding for al Qaeda.204 
B. COLLABORATION OF CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS 
While financing of terrorism through criminal means is well established, there is 
some speculation as to an emerging trend involving the collaboration of criminals and 
terrorists.  Internationally operating criminal and terrorist groups are increasingly 
collaborating with one another.205  Both groups are partnering with one another and have 
increased sharing organizational and operational characteristics.206   
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Just one example of this can be seen in the Madrid train attacks.  Jamal Ahmidan, 
a leader of the Madrid attacks, was a common criminal with previous arrests for murder 
and drug dealing.207  His ties to a criminal network were instrumental in the carrying out 
of this terrorist attack.  Specifically, he used the connections from his criminal network to 
obtain the explosives used in the Madrid train attack.208 
There also remains concern of terrorists collaborating with transnational gangs 
such as MS-13.209  Since MS-13 is often involved with drug smugglers and human 
traffickers, there is concern that terrorists may seek an alliance with a transnational gang 
in order to secure entry into the United States.210  It was reported in 2004 that an al 
Qaeda member was spotted in Honduras meeting with MS-13 leaders perhaps seeking to 
arrange his illegal entry into the United States.211  Additionally, it was reported that a 
2005 DEA memo suggests that Middle Eastern terrorist cells operating in the United 
States have collaborated with drug smuggling gangs such as MS-13 with proceeds from 
their illegal activities going to fund terrorist operations overseas.212  While the former 
director of the FBI’s MS-13 task force claims that the link between al Qaeda and MS-13 
is “improbable”213 the former ICE Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia warned in 
testimony before Congress that there remains a threat that “any criminal organization that 
exploits our borders for profit could, for the right price, bring in terrorists or bring in 
components of weapons of mass destruction.”214 
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One possible explanation for this trend of terrorists collaborating and developing 
their own criminal capabilities is law enforcement’s increase in scrutiny given to 
charitable organizations that were once a large source of funding.215  There exists a 
possible “transformation” where a terrorist organization’s financial needs are causing the 
alignment to criminal enterprise and organized crime.216  Enabling this trend has also 
been linked with globalization of the world’s communication, travel and economics.217   
C. REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS 
An examination of the possible alignment of terrorist and criminal entities as well 
as the examination of the undeniable historical link between criminal activity and the 
funding of terrorist organizations only affirms the need to remove criminal aliens from 
the United States.  The removal of these criminal aliens is likely to disrupt the funding of 
terrorist organizations.  This disruption of funding could lead to the dissolution of 
terrorist networks.  While the removed aliens may continue their criminal ways in their 
home country, their removal from the United States, aside from the benefit of decreasing 
crime itself, would decrease American dollars being funneled from criminal enterprise to 
terrorist organizations.   
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V. RESEARCH RESULT 
The continued presence of criminal aliens in the United States represents a 
significant threat to the security of the homeland.  With possible radicalization in the 
prison environment as well as possible financing of terrorism through criminal activity, 
an effective and efficient means to remove the criminal aliens from the United States 
needs to be developed and implemented.  This thesis explores several ways that ICE and 
the law enforcement community can accomplish identification, detention and removal of 
criminal aliens in an effective and efficient manner.   
The research conducted for this thesis was done through in-depth interviews.  
Officials from ICE’s DRO were interviewed for over a three-month period.  All those 
interviewed were informed that research was being conducted for this thesis.  After being 
assured anonymity, they were informed that personal opinions and candid responses were 
sought to achieve a better understanding of where possible areas of improvement lie 
within the CAP.218  A sampling of DRO officials was selected from ICE offices from 
diverse geographical locations.  The officials interviewed are from large, medium and 
small sized ICE field offices.  They have numerous years of experience with ICE and 
legacy INS.  They hold a variety of management and supervisory positions within DRO 
including Field Office Directors, Assistant Field Office Directors and Supervisory 
Deportation Officers.  Also interviewed was a member of New York’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Force (JTTF) and a high-ranking official in the New York Police Department’s 
Counterterrorism Unit.   
Participation in the interview process was on a voluntary basis.  Those 
interviewed were assured that their responses would remain anonymous unless they 
consented to the disclosure of their identity.  The interviews were conducted both 
telephonically and in person and those participating were asked the same series of 
questions with slight variation and follow-up questions.  The purpose of these interviews 
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with DRO officials was to determine the best practices being employed by DRO officials 
nationwide for the most effective and efficient means of removing criminal aliens from 
the United States.  The purpose of the interviews with members of New York’s 
counterterrorism community was to ascertain where ICE’s CAP fits within the nation’s 
homeland security strategy. 
The DRO officials interviewed agree that the effectiveness of ICE’s CAP should 
be measured by the number of criminal aliens identified and referred to ICE and the 
number of removals of those aliens.  There are a variety of factors that effect ICE’s 
defined effectiveness.  These factors include funding and resources, outreach and 
collaboration, solutions addressing bed-space issues and concern for change in political 
climate. 
The counterterrorism experts consulted see a definitive link between criminal 
activity and terrorism.  The use of criminal charges to neutralize a terrorist threat was 
seen as an effective counterterrorist measure.  Punishing wrongdoers with the application 
of the rule of law is a “major tenet of officially expressed U.S. counterterrorist policy.”219  
However, the individuals interviewed were unaware of ICE’s efforts regarding the CAP 
or how it relates to any U.S. counterterrorism strategy.   
A. FUNDING AND RESOURCES 
DRO was tasked with taking over ICE’s CAP from the Office of Investigations 
(OI) in September 2006 and officially took over the program in April 2007.  ICE’s 
criminal alien arrest procedures are now tasked to one entity.  All DRO officials 
interviewed cited to the tremendous increase in criminal aliens identified since DRO took 
control of all aspects of CAP. 
With the increase of its area of responsibility, the primary concern of ICE DRO 
officials in fulfilling their mission to identify, detain and remove all criminal aliens in the 
United States remains available resources and funding.  As one official explained it, DRO 
is now tasked with identifying criminal aliens at the local and county level under the 
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Secure Communities Strategic Plan with current funding and staffing levels.220  Their 
jurisdiction has expanded without the corresponding expansion of resources.  Such a 
tasking is challenging for numerous reasons. 
Adding to DRO’s lack of additional funding, geographical distance from the local 
and county jail facilities presents the next largest hurdle in accomplishing ICE’s CAP 
mission.  One DRO official described their current jurisdiction as encompassing six 
states.221  Another’s jurisdiction included one of the most populated areas in the 
nation.222  In practical terms, an ICE field office can be hundreds of miles and several 
hours from the facilities they are now tasked with covering.  Face to face meetings with 
local officials is difficult and sporadic at best.  Given the size of the jurisdiction of some 
ICE field offices, having the manpower to physically go to each jail facility within their 
jurisdiction is not possible given current staffing levels.   
DRO officials agree that they do not have enough staff to provide 24/7 coverage 
to their local and county facilities.  At best, they provide coverage of these facilities 
during normal business hours.  In practical terms, if a criminal alien is arrested by local 
law enforcement in the middle of the night, that alien could bond out prior to ICE even 
being notified.   
To demonstrate what can be accomplished with 24/7 coverage, DRO has initiated 
a number of “CAP surges” throughout the United States.  A CAP surge entails DRO 
staffing one selected local or county jail on a 24/7 basis for a given time period.  This 
ensures that 100% of the criminal aliens encountered are identified and processed.  ICE is 
also piloting a Law Enforcement Agency Response Unit (LEAR) that is dedicated to 
responding to law enforcement calls for assistance regarding both criminal and non-
criminal aliens encountered on a 24/7 basis.223  The increase in the number of criminal 
aliens encountered through these initiatives will be used to demonstrate the need for more 
funding and possibly lead to 24/7 ICE coverage at local and county jails. 
                                                 
220 Anonymous DRO official, interviewed by author on October 2, 2008. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Anonymous DRO official, interviewed by author on August 29, 2008. 
223 Anonymous DRO official, interviewed by author on October 2, 2008. 
 54
In addition to not having enough staff, numerous DRO officials cited to lacking 
the appropriate resources to accomplish its mission.  The resources enumerated as 
deficient include office space, computer equipment and vehicles.  Vehicles are needed to 
transport the DRO staff during the identification and screening process as well for the 
transport of the criminal aliens released to ICE’s custody.   
Some DRO officials cited to the use of technology through telephonic and VTC 
equipment to alleviate the need for ICE agents to travel physically from site to site.  ICE 
agents cannot rely on the use of VTC due to existing language barriers or the need to 
fingerprint the criminal aliens and complete the identification process.224  The use of 
technology also cannot take the place of an ICE agent who is needed to affect an arrest 
and transport the criminal aliens to an ICE detention facility.  Indeed, the technology 
often is not in place at the local and county facilities.   
Currently, where an Inter-Governmental Service Agreement is not in place,225 
Immigration Enforcement Agents (IEAs) physically transport criminal aliens from 
federal, state, local or county jails to ICE detention facilities.226  Often the jail and the 
ICE detention facility are not within physical proximity to one another.  Indeed, a 
criminal alien is often transported across state lines to the only available bed-space.  As 
such, a large portion of the IEA’s time is spent transporting criminal aliens rather than 
identifying and processing them when first notified by correctional or law enforcement 
officials.227   
B. OUTREACH AND COLLABORATION 
1. Local Law Enforcement 
In expanding CAP to the local and county level, developing relationships with 
local law enforcement at these levels is instrumental in developing a collaborative work 
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environment.  These relationships are developed and nurtured through face-to-face 
contact and consistent interaction with ICE officials.  Local law enforcement needs to 
stay informed about whom to contact should a criminal alien be encountered.  The 
relationship that exists between local law enforcement and ICE varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  Some DRO officials extolled their office’s ability to have relationships with 
local and county corrections departments as well as local probation departments.228  
Others were still developing these relationships.   
A significant impediment to the development of personal relationships with local 
law enforcement remains geographical proximity.  As one DRO official explained, their 
office has great working relationships with local law enforcement offices that are 
physically located close to the ICE field office.  However, as the physical distance 
between the ICE field office and the local law enforcement offices grew, the strength of 
the collaborative relationship decreased.229  This official conceded that their office 
doesn’t visit distant local law enforcement offices more than once a year.230  
Local law enforcement also needs to be informed about ICE procedures and ICE’s 
ability to pick up an identified criminal alien.  ICE’ Office of State and Local 
Coordination (OSLC) has made significant improvements to outreach efforts.  Indeed, 
ICE Access is a program presented at various local law enforcement conferences.  One of 
the biggest hurdles identified is the lack of a Memorandum of Understanding between 
local law enforcement and ICE.  One DRO official identified the need for a Standard 
Operating Procedure concerning criminal aliens identified by local law enforcement 
during “off” hours.231  As stated above, most ICE offices do not have the capability to 
respond to local law enforcement on a 24/7 basis.   
Local law enforcement within sanctuary jurisdictions pose a significant 
impediment to ICE’s ability to identify, detain and remove criminal aliens.  DRO 
officials report having no contact whatsoever with local law enforcement from sanctuary 
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jurisdictions.  Such jurisdictions will not provide ICE with a list of foreign-born criminal 
aliens encountered and refuse to let ICE into their facilities to conduct interviews.  The 
basic tenets that led to the creation of sanctuary cities are that local law enforcement does 
not want their residents to be afraid of the police in the area of reporting crime.  
However, these tenets are inapplicable to ICE’s CAP mission.  Under Secure 
Communities, ICE continues its enforcement efforts not by going into the community and 
detaining every illegal alien as some sanctuary city advocates maintain.  Instead, ICE’s 
CAP focuses exclusively on individuals who have already broken the law and are already 
in law enforcement’s custody.  More outreach is needed to these sanctuary jurisdictions 
to educate local law enforcement about their significant role in ICE’s CAP and that CAP 
does not undermine the tenets of their sanctuary jurisdiction. 
In contrast to sanctuary cities, some local law enforcement are actively using ICE 
to rid their streets of “unwanted” immigrants.  A DRO official cited to numerous 
instances where an alien is arrested on criminal charges and ICE is contacted.  As soon as 
ICE lodges a detainer on the alien, all criminal charges against the alien are dropped.232  
In effect, this ensures that the alien is removed from their community with little to no 
effort or expense to that community.  The abuse of ICE’s CAP program in instances such 
as this must be addressed with the communities involved.   
2. 287(g) Authority 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) 
enacted 1996 added a provision, Section 287(g), in which state officers and employees 
may be authorized to perform immigration officer functions.233  The Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security has the authority to enter into agreements with state 
and local law enforcement permitting them to perform immigration officer functions,  
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with the requisite training, pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).234  
Currently there are only 63 active 287(g) MOAs with 840 trained officers in twenty states 
in the entire United States.235  
While this 287(g) program trains local law enforcement, it is the local field offices 
that remain responsible to supervise these local law enforcement officials.  With the 
supervision by ICE, local law enforcement is then able to act as an ICE official 
themselves having the full authority to arrest and detain aliens based upon immigration 
law violations.  Unfortunately, the majority of DRO officials interviewed did not have 
287(g) trained local law enforcement within their jurisdiction.  
Those offices that did have 287(g) trained officials under them touted the program 
as a force multiplier and integral to the success of one ICE office.236  Several DRO 
officials stated that local law enforcement’s 287(g) capabilities was essential to enforcing 
immigration laws in physically remote areas.  While requiring a significant amount of 
supervision by ICE, the program nonetheless afforded ICE officials to allocate resources 
to other jurisdictions without similar capabilities.  Accordingly, these ICE offices were 
able to assure 100% screening of criminal aliens within their jurisdiction.   
Even with its touted benefits, there remains concern about the possible abuse of 
the 287(g) program by local law enforcement.  One DRO official cited the possible use of 
287(g) authority to “clean up” the streets of their community by deporting those deemed 
undesirable.237  Possible racial profiling was yet another concern.238  Overall, there 
remains a general consensus that 287(g) authority would be most effective in a 
corrections environment.  Corrections officials would be able to identify and process all 
foreign-born inmates.  This would include conducting appropriate checks in ICE’s 
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databases and the ability to detain the inmates on immigration violations.  This would 
allow ICE to redistribute its resources to the local and county levels ensuring that no 
criminal alien escapes being processed through the immigration system.   
3. Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Most DRO officials were satisfied with their relationship with EOIR.  One area of 
expressed dissatisfaction with EOIR involved stipulated removals.  A particular office 
could not pursue stipulated removals with detained aliens due to the Immigration Judge’s 
unwillingness to sign orders of removal from a stipulated removal within their 
jurisdiction.239  A distinct lack of trust exists between DRO and EOIR such that 
Immigration Judges do not feel aliens would voluntarily stipulate to removal from the 
United States.  The Immigration Judges’ refusal to adjudicate stipulated removals was 
described as a significant hindrance to DRO’s ability to effectively remove aliens.240  
While stipulated removals do not necessarily involve criminal aliens, it impacts ICE’s 
ability to make bed-space available for criminal aliens rather than being tied up with non-
criminal aliens who simply want to return to their native country rather than be detained 
by ICE. 
Another area of dissatisfaction remains EOIR’s willingness to conduct 
immigration hearings using VTC capabilities.  Despite having the legal authority to 
conduct immigration hearings via VTC, some Immigration Judges still insist on an alien 
being physically brought to their immigration courtroom.  This is a significant drain on 
DRO’s resources since manpower is needed to transport the alien to their immigration 
hearing.  This manpower could be used more effectively in the identifying and processing 
criminal aliens at the local and county level.  To address and possibly remedy these 
concerns, DRO has set up a number of meetings with EOIR officials.   
Even if willing to conduct hearings via VTC, some EOIR courtrooms lack the 
requisite equipment.  Some lack VTC equipment all together while others have outdated 
VTC technology.  Budget restraints prevent EOIR from obtaining VTC capability.  
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Additionally, since ICE is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security and 
EOIR is an agency within Department of Justice, ICE cannot simply give EOIR the 
equipment it needs.   
DRO officials in the field were unaware of any collaboration with EOIR about 
any possible expansion of the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction to include local and 
county jails.  Most were skeptical as to the ability to conduct immigration hearings while 
a criminal alien was in the custody of local and county officials.  The high rate of 
turnover combined with the likelihood of an alien’s release prior to an immigration 
hearing were the most often cited concerns. 
4. U.S. Attorney Offices   
Working relationships between ICE and local U.S. Attorney offices was 
consistently described as excellent.  Despite this excellent collaborative working 
relationship, one area of concern remains the percentage of illegal reentry cases241 
presented to the U.S. Attorney Office, which are accepted for prosecution.  While there 
appears to be great variance from office to office, the U.S. Attorney offices that are not 
on the Mexican border declined to prosecute a majority of the cases presented to them by 
ICE officials.242  While one DRO office along the border explained that their U.S. 
Attorney’s office prosecutes all reentry cases presented, a DRO official from an interior 
ICE office explained that their office has a 30% rate of acceptance for prosecution.243  
Each U.S. Attorney’s office has developed their own criteria for acceptance of illegal 
reentry cases for each jurisdiction.  There appears to be a surge in prosecutions of these 
types of cases in certain jurisdictions.  For example, illegal reentry cases have become the 
single most prosecuted crime by the U.S. Attorney’s office in Los Angeles.244  In 
contrast, a DRO official from an interior ICE office stated that for the case to be accepted 
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by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in their jurisdiction, the alien must have reentered the 
United States at least five times or been convicted of an aggravated felony.245  Regardless 
of the criteria set by the U.S. Attorney’s office, some DRO offices present every reentry 
case for prosecution.246   
Workload and staffing levels of the U.S. Attorney’s office hinder their ability to 
prosecute cases presented by ICE officials.  An interviewed DRO official could not 
understand the workload argument because the majority of the work in prosecuting the 
case is done by the ICE agent assigned to the case.247  This official described re-entry 
cases as “easy” wins for the U.S. Attorney’s office.248  Special Assistant United States 
Attorneys (SAUSAs), ICE attorneys assigned to the U.S. Attorney’s office in their 
jurisdiction to aid in the adjudication of both criminal and civil immigration matters, 
could be used to address staffing shortages in the U.S. Attorney’s Offices. 
5. Consulates and Embassies   
DRO interacts with consulates and embassies in processing an alien for removal 
when securing travel documents for the foreign nationals in their custody.  DRO’s 
relationship with consulates and embassies varies greatly and depends on the country 
involved.  Most Central and Southern American countries are responsive to ICE requests 
for the requisite travel documents.  In fact, DRO officials nationwide touted the success 
of the Electronic Travel Document system (eTD) where ICE now obtains travel 
documents for aliens from Central America within 24 hours.  It is hoped that the eTD will 
be expanded to other countries in the future. 
Other countries’ responses to ICE’s request for a travel document are slow to non-
existent.  Some are extremely hesitant to assist in the return of their nationals who have 
committed crimes in the United States fearing an increase in crime in their own 
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country.249  Additionally, a DRO official speculated that other countries economies are 
dependent upon their nationals funneling dollars earned in the United States back into 
their own economy.250  When their nationals are removed from the United States, the 
amount of money pumped into their economy decreases.  As a result, some consulates are 
markedly slow to issue travel documents. 
There exist a number of countries that do not have a diplomatic relationship with 
the United States.  Not only is ICE unable to obtain travel documents for these criminal 
aliens, ICE is unable to enforce removal orders from these countries.  Cuban nationals are 
just one example of criminal aliens against whom a removal order is often ineffective.  
Prior to 2001, ICE officials were indefinitely detaining criminal aliens with little to no 
hope of enforcing a removal order.  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zavydas,251 ICE has no choice but to release these criminal aliens back into the general 
population when there exists no likelihood of removal.   
When the United States does have a diplomatic relationship with a given country, 
the issuance of travel documents requires an interview by the consulate to ensure that the 
alien is in fact from the stated country.  While some consulates conduct telephonic 
interviews, ICE is often left to transport the alien to the consulate for an in-person travel 
document interview.  Instead of transporting each individual alien, ICE often arranges to 
transport an employee from the consulate to conduct the interview to where the alien is 
housed.  Most consulates do not have the capability to conduct these interviews via VTC. 
A DRO official speculated that the consulates are unwilling to explore VTC options for 
conducting interviews because they would lose a significant perk – travel across the 
country at the expense of the U.S. government.252 
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C. SOLUTIONS ADDRESSING BED-SPACE 
With the significant increase of criminal aliens being identified under the 
expansion of CAP to the local and county levels, solutions addressing bed-space must be 
developed in order for DRO to effectively accomplish its mission.  DRO officials 
unanimously agreed that there exists a significant need for additional bed-space.  
Detaining criminal aliens is the most effective way to ensure their removal from the 
United States.  However, this requires a substantial increase in funding to either construct 
additional ICE detention facilities or secure bed-space through Inter-Government Service 
Agreements (IGSAs) with local jails.  In 2006, it was estimated that an additional 35,000 
beds at a cost of 1.1 billion dollars would be needed to detain all CAP aliens and aliens 
from countries designated as special interest countries known for promoting terrorism.253   
1. Stipulated and Administrative Removals 
Rather than creating more bed-space, the turn around time from initial detention 
by ICE to removal from the United States was examined.  DRO officials agree that 
stipulated removals and administrative removals increase DRO’s speed in effecting a 
removal from the United States freeing up much needed bed-space.  Some jurisdictions 
concede, however, that they have not fully explored the use of stipulated removals and 
administrative removals.  Indeed, one jurisdiction does not use administrative removals 
whatsoever conceding that there has been no directive from ICE headquarters mandating 
their use.  Manpower appeared to be the biggest barrier to implementing the use of more 
administrative removals.  The barrier standing in the way of DRO’s use of more 
stipulated removals appears to be EOIR’s willingness to adjudicate stipulated removals. 
2. Rapid REPAT 
Launched in 2008, ICE’s Rapid REPAT initiative was favorably seen in the eyes 
of DRO officials.  This program encourages states to enact laws that allow for the early 
parole of non-violent criminal aliens where they agree to removal from the United States.  
There exist guidelines such that a criminal must have served half their minimum sentence 
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in order to be considered for Rapid REPAT.  These programs encourage criminal aliens 
to not fight their immigration cases in Immigration Court.  By avoiding litigation that 
delays the removal process, bed-space is made available more quickly.  Currently, only 
New York, Arizona, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and Georgia have such laws in effect.   
3. Travel Documents 
Another impediment to the quick removal of criminal aliens from the United 
States is the speed at which ICE can obtain travel documents from consulates.  In dealing 
with aliens other than Mexicans (OTMs),254 ICE has had limited success in obtaining 
travel documents in a timely fashion.  The eTD system that is used to obtain travel 
documents for aliens originating from Central America has been extremely successful.  
However, for aliens not originating from a Central American country, ICE currently starts 
the process of obtaining travel documents for criminal aliens only when these aliens are 
physically in ICE’s custody.  ICE needs to obtain these documents in close proximity to 
the alien’s actual removal because currently travel documents issued by the various 
consulates have expiration dates.  No official interviewed could explain why these travel 
documents have expiration dates.  Indeed, no DRO official was aware of whether travel 
documents could be obtained without expiration dates.  
4. Detention Alternatives 
Alternatives to detention were explored with the DRO officials interviewed.  
Experience with such programs varied by jurisdiction.  One DRO official was adamant 
that alternatives to detention should not be used for any criminal alien whether or not 
they were subject to mandatory detention.255  Under Secure Communities, ICE cannot 
now identify and process all criminal aliens present in the United States only to release 
them back into the population.256 
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Alternatives to detention can be used with non-criminal aliens freeing up much 
needed bed-space for the worst of the worst.  Alternatives employed by ICE to date 
include the Intensive Supervisory Alien Program (ISAP) and electronic monitoring.257  
The ISAP closely monitors aliens throughout the removal process while allowing them to 
remain free in American society.  Electronic monitoring of aliens involves the alien 
wearing an ankle bracelet on a 24/7 basis.  Both programs have been successful in 
monitoring aliens outside of actual detention and seen success in their actual removal.  
Each jurisdiction however has a limited availability for these programs – one jurisdiction 
had the capability of only monitoring 100 aliens via ankle bracelet.258  The capability of 
these alternative detention programs is dependent upon the requisite funding needed to 
support them.   
D. CHANGE IN POLITICAL CLIMATE 
There remains an overwhelming concern by DRO officials about any change in 
political climate.  Historically, enforcement of immigration laws was dependent upon the 
Executive and Legislative Branches’ initiatives.  Immigration is a political issue at its 
heart and depends upon the current political climate.  Typically, in times of economic 
downturn, fears of illegal immigration and accompanying cheap labor that undermines 
American workers lead politicians to push immigration to the foreground.  After 9/11, 
Congress demanded greater security in our legal immigration and the hardening of our 
borders against illegal immigration in order to thwart the efforts of terrorists seeking 
entry through our borders.  Accordingly, ICE saw tremendous increases to its budget in 
the years following the 9/11 attacks.   
There has been much talk recently about the need for immigration reform.  While 
the latest immigration reform initiative failed in Congress in 2007,259 there still remains  
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the possibility of the enactment of new laws.  The funding allocated to ICE initiatives is 
directly tied to the political climate.  Without a supportive Congress and Administration, 
the expansion of CAP to the local and county level cannot occur.   
E. USING CAP IN OUR NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 
When an alien with potential terrorist ties is encountered, often basic immigration 
charges are used to remove them from the United States.  There are numerous grounds of 
removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act260 – overstaying a visa, entering 
without inspection, being convicted of certain crimes, failing to maintain status (failing to 
attend school or being employed while in the country on a student or visitor visa).  A 
person is put into removal proceedings with the issuance of a Notice to Appear and will 
appear before an Immigration Judge who determines whether the charges are sustained 
and whether the respondent has any relief from removal.   
ICE keeps the end-game in mind when placing a person of significant national 
security interest into removal proceedings.  These cases are often referred to ICE from 
the JTTF.  The evidence of a person’s terrorist ties is often classified and/or comes from 
confidential sources.261  Because a person with suspected ties is not brought up on 
terrorist charges, their links to terrorism are often never disclosed.262  There is often very 
little admissible evidence relating to their terrorist ties that can be used in a court of law.  
Similar to Al Capone being convicted of tax evasion, any available law enforcement tool 
is used to ensure the person of interest is processed and possibly removed.263  Indeed, the 
JTTF interview disclosed that once an individual becomes a person of interest, 
investigators often look for criminal activity or immigration violations.264 Basic 
immigration violations are used in these national security cases to ensure that the end-
game of getting the suspected terrorists out of the country as quickly as possible. 
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Criminal aliens pose a unique threat to homeland security.  Their criminal ties 
often provide a network that terrorist find appealing.265  Methods employed by drug 
traffickers to get their product into the United States may be used to smuggle explosive 
devices or other weapons into this country.266  Similarly, terrorists may be smuggled into 
the United States with the aid of human traffickers.267  While removal of these 
individuals from the United States may neutralize an immediate threat, there still exists 
concern about our ability to track these individuals once they are removed.268 
In addition to posing a unique threat, criminal aliens also provide a unique 
opportunity for law enforcement.  They often provide information about individuals or 
other criminal activity that might of interest to the United States.269  Additionally, law 
enforcement officials are frequently able to recruit these individuals as sources within 
their ethnic community.270   
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VI. A MEGACOMMUNITY SOLUTION 
A “megacommunity” has been defined as “communities of organizations whose 
leaders and members have deliberately come together across national, organizational, and 
sectoral boundaries to reach the goals they cannot achieve alone.”271  A uniting goal 
propels the group toward a harmonious and sustained working relationship for the long 
term.272  A megacommunity “demand[s] a change in orientation from the leaders of the 
various organizations involved.”273 
Through Secure Communities, ICE is attempting to change how every level of 
law enforcement views the individuals it encounters.  Current processes must be altered 
to develop the most effective and efficient means of identifying, detaining and removing 
criminal aliens that are encountered.  Accomplishing this change will necessarily involve 
conquering both tangible and intangible hurdles. 
In the book Blue Ocean Strategy, the authors studied how change was 
accomplished in over one hundred and fifty companies and organizations from a variety 
of public and private industries.274  While private companies who are profit driven differ 
markedly from government agencies in many respects, much can be learned from the 
successful strategic planning explored by the authors.   
The authors set forth four organization hurdles to strategy execution:  “the 
cognitive hurdle that blinds employees from seeing that radical change is necessary; the 
resource hurdle that is endemic in firms; the motivational hurdle that discourages and 
demoralizes staff; and the political hurdle of internal and external resistance to 
change.”275  The authors explore how these hurdles are overcome through a tipping-point 
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theory.  Tipping-point theory “hinges on the insight that in any organization, fundamental 
changes can happen quickly when the beliefs and energies of a critical mass of people 
create an epidemic movement toward an idea.”276  It is this tipping point that ICE needs 
to create overcoming both cognitive and resource hurdles in order to expand the Criminal 
Alien Program to all levels of law enforcement.   
A. LOCAL AND COUNTY JAILS, ICE, EOIR, U.S. ATTORNEYS AND 
CONSULATES AS MEGACOMMUNITY 
ICE is currently drafting its Secure Communities strategic plan.  The document 
itself is important as it will provide a guide for ICE management.  The plan, however, is 
not as important as the trust-based relationships that need to be developed in order to 
accomplish ICE’s enumerated goals in the expansion of the CAP.  Indeed, in April 2008, 
Assistant Secretary Julie Meyers issued a memorandum entitled Community Outreach 
setting forth the importance of establishing enhanced levels of trust and confidence with 
all involved stakeholders in order to accomplish ICE’s mission.277  In addition to issuing 
its Secure Communities strategic plan, ICE needs to rally all stakeholders into a 
megacommunity that reaches its tipping point moving forward with the expansion of the 
CAP at all levels of law enforcement. 
Applying lessons learned from the relationship of legacy INS, NYDOCs and 
EOIR, ICE’s expansion of its CAP at all local and county jails must involve the 
development of a symbiotic working relationship.  The research from this thesis 
demonstrates that ICE’s DRO field office managers believe that cooperative relationships 
between ICE and local law enforcement essential to achieving expansion of the CAP. All 
parties must understand the wants and needs of those involved.  Only then can common 
goals be defined and a working structure developed.278 
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Lines of communication must be established that are effective and efficient for all 
parties.  Several interviewees reported that certain DRO field offices are responsible for a 
large geographic jurisdiction that often span several states and hundreds of miles.  The 
proximity of local law enforcement to an ICE field office directly relates to the quality of 
the cooperative relationship that develops.  Therefore, geographic limitations mandate 
that electronic means of communication between local and county officials and ICE be 
developed.  Regular telephone calls or email communications will solidify a cooperative 
working relationship and remind local law enforcement of their key role in securing the 
homeland against criminal aliens. 
Initially, local and county officials must be educated regarding their responsibility 
to identify foreign-born individuals to be interviewed by ICE.  A “sanctuary” attitude 
must be eliminated so that law enforcement is working toward the same goal of removing 
criminal aliens from the United States.  While ICE’s education of local law enforcement 
may be sufficient to establish a cooperative environment, it may be necessary to reach out 
to state leadership to eliminate sanctuary policies to clear the way for cooperation with 
ICE.  No longer should a particular city’s sanctuary attitudes be allowed to determine the 
level of cooperation ICE receives in identifying criminal aliens.  Only when the cognitive 
hurdle of “sanctuary” attitudes by local law enforcement encountered by ICE agents on a 
regular basis is eliminated, will cooperation be allowed to flourish.   
Integration of technology will assist local law enforcement.  Local law 
enforcement must have access to immigration records when a criminal is encountered.  
When a person’s biometric information is run through the FBI’s NCIC database, it should 
simultaneously pull information from ICE’s records without having to make a separate 
query.  While the interviewees concede that ICE does not currently provide 24/7 
coverage of local detention facilities, local law enforcement must nonetheless be given 
access to all relevant information necessary to perform their role within ICE’s Secure 
Communities plan.  To date, pilot programs have been launched by ICE to link jails in six 
counties in North Carolina and Texas to allow local authorities to access immigration 
databases in addition to the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
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of criminal records.279  Such interoperability must continue to expand nationwide to 
empower local law enforcement with the tools necessary to identify foreign born criminal 
aliens.  Assistant Secretary Julie Meyers stated that “Interoperability will create a virtual 
ICE presence at every local jail, allowing us to identify and ultimately remove dangerous 
incarcerated criminal aliens from our communities.”280   
While local law enforcement requires information to perform their role, likewise, 
ICE has certain needs in order to perform their role within the CAP efficiently.  The 
majority of the interviewees stated that local law enforcement was cooperative in 
assisting ICE in obtaining the requisite documentation.  Local law enforcement must 
continue to be educated as to their integral role in generating the information necessary 
for ICE to accomplish its mission to identify, detain and remove all criminal aliens.  The 
information necessary for ICE to move forward with removal proceedings must be 
secured from a suspected foreign-born individual.  This can be accomplished during the 
initial booking process by law enforcement officers or at the intake process into a local 
jail simply by inquiring about place of birth.   
Once local law enforcement is made fully aware of their integral role in the CAP, 
specific tasks must be assigned.  Local law enforcement should furnish ICE a list of 
foreign-born individuals on a regular basis through a standardized process.  Lists of 
identified individuals must be communicated to ICE via electronic means since ICE does 
not have the resources to have a physical presence at every local or county facility.  
Memorandums of Understandings between local law enforcement and ICE are needed to 
clarify local law enforcement’s release of identified criminal aliens.  As the interviews 
suggest, the ad hoc procedures currently employed by each local jail makes for 
inconsistent results in identifying and detaining criminal aliens.   
In addition to the list, identifying those suspected of being foreign born, court 
documents and conviction records within the inmate’s records at the prison or jail must 
be forwarded easing ICE’s preparation of a removal case.  This will conserve ICE 
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resources by obviating the need to expend ICE personnel to retrieve the requisite records 
from the local, county and state courts through which criminal aliens are prosecuted.  An 
additional way to conserve ICE resources involves the exploration of a VTC system for 
local law enforcement that is compatible with ICE’s current system.  If ICE is able 
leverage VTC technology to interview identified inmates, it is not necessary for ICE 
personnel expend both time and resources traveling from jail to jail.   
Interviewees identified an additional way to conserve ICE resources through 
obtaining contracted transportation for moving criminal aliens from jail to an ICE 
detention facility through IGSAs.  While an Immigration Enforcement Agent (IEA) 
would be needed to affect the arrest and transfer of custody from the local law 
enforcement to ICE, an IEA is not necessarily needed to transport that criminal alien.  
IEAs who are relieved of having to perform transportation duties would then be free to 
further develop relationships with local law enforcement leading to the identification of 
more criminal aliens.  Indeed, they would be free to develop relationships with probation 
offices in addition to local and county jails to ensure that criminal aliens who were not 
previously referred by local law enforcement to ICE would be identified.  Development 
of personal relationships between ICE and local law enforcement can then become a 
main focus of IEAs rather than merely transporting criminal aliens.   
Local and county officials should also develop a working relationship with ICE 
regarding the arrest of these identified inmates when they are ready for release from local 
and county custody.  The interviewees confirmed that ICE resources would be 
maximized should release dates and times be limited to several days per week at only a 
set number of facilities.  Given that the research revealed that an ICE office might have 
responsibility over numerous local and county jails, cross-sector coordination between 
these facilities will be necessary so that only prisons in close proximity to one another are 
releasing inmates to ICE’s custody on the same day.   
In addition to establishing a relationship with local law enforcement, ICE must 
commence a dialogue with EOIR about the possibility of having an Immigration Court 
that could travel to the various local and county facilities for removal hearings as part of 
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an IRP.281  If a traveling court is too taxing on EOIR resources, the possibility of linking 
local and county jails to immigration courts such that immigration hearings could be held 
via VTC should be fully explored.  Since the research revealed DRO’s concern about 
quick release times of criminal aliens encountered at the local and county levels, a 
traveling or VTC immigration court could address those concerns.  This exploration will 
necessarily involve local and county officials providing EOIR physical space to conduct 
hearings within the confines of the local facilities or having the necessary VTC 
equipment.  It may also entail the request for funding for additional Immigration Judges 
to adjudicate all of the criminal aliens encountered with the expansion of CAP.   
Similarly, a dialogue must be established with EOIR nationwide to develop 
standard practices and procedures regarding stipulated removals to address the problems 
identified in this thesis.  No longer should individual Immigration Judges be allowed to 
simply not adjudicate stipulated removals.  Immigration Judges should also not be 
allowed to refuse to conduct VTC hearings.  With standard practices in place, the 
removal process will necessarily be streamlined. 
It must be noted however, that with more criminal aliens being identified and 
placed into removal proceedings, a more effective and efficient means of removing them 
from the United States must be established.  DRO officials confirmed that improvements 
have been made in ICE’s ability to obtain travel documents from certain foreign countries 
– mainly Central American countries.  More remains to be done.   
The DRO interviews confirm that there are certain countries with which the 
United States does not have diplomatic relations and still other countries who refuse to 
accept the return of their criminal aliens.  The Department of State must commence a 
dialogue with identified foreign countries such that they are more receptive to accepting 
the return of their criminal deportees.  Incentives for countries to comply with ICE’s 
request for travel documents should be explored to accomplish this goal.   
                                                 
281 While the interviewees conceded that they were unaware of any existing dialogue between EOIR 
and ICE, these dialogues may be occurring at the headquarters level. 
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Consistent means for obtaining travel documents from consulates must be 
established to increase the speed with which such documents are issued.  The 
interviewees confirmed that ICE does not commence obtaining a travel document until 
the alien has a final order of removal and is in ICE’s custody.  While waiting until a final 
order of removal is obtained is understandable, it is unclear why the alien must be in ICE 
custody.  One DRO official attributed the delay to consulates requiring expiration dates 
on travel documents.  It may be necessary for the Department of State to negotiate ICE’s 
ability to obtain travel documents without expiration dates.  If travel documents must in 
fact contain expiration dates, extending the validity of travel documents must be 
negotiated to afford DRO the maximum amount of time to remove the aliens in their 
custody.  
With more criminal aliens having significant ties to this country being removed, 
there is a likelihood that these individuals will seek to reenter the United States.  This 
thesis has revealed that illegal aliens who reenter the United States after having been 
removed currently face inconsistent criminal consequences and may not be prosecuted at 
all for this federal offense.  While laws currently exist to prosecute these individuals, the 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices nationwide must establish clear and consistent guidelines for 
prosecuting illegal re-entry cases.  Aliens that return to this country after removal must 
face certain prosecution in federal court for their actions.  To address workload issues, the 
U.S. Attorney’s office should rely on the resources of the ICE agents who present these 
cases for prosecution allowing them to handle the large volume of cases.  DRO officials 
confirm that ICE agents do all of the initial investigatory work prior to presenting a case 
to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for prosecution.  Indeed, the interviewees confirm that these 
are “easy” or “slam dunk” cases to be prosecuted.  While the volume of potential cases is 
quite large, the U.S. Attorney’s Office may be able to reach out to their local ICE Chief 
Counsel’s office about the possibility of a SAUSA being assigned to prosecute these 
matters.  No longer should an ad hoc approach from each U.S. Attorney office be 
tolerated.  The U.S. Attorneys office nationwide must join ICE’s CAP megacommunity 
to ensure that aliens who return to this country after removal are criminally prosecuted.   
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ICE must encourage the expansion of its Rapid REPAT program with states that 
do not already have a similar program in existence.  With outreach to the states in this 
area, ICE will ensure the growth of its CAP megacommunity.  Those interviewed 
confirm that such incentives ease the removal process considerably.  While criminal 
aliens see the benefit of agreeing to removal to get out of jail at an earlier date, states 
must be educated regarding the financial benefits of such programs.  Since the enactment 
of legislation will necessarily take time, the process must begin now.  By enacting Rapid 
REPAT type legislation similar to what already exists in New York, Arizona, Puerto 
Rico, Rhode Island and Georgia, the cost of litigating the removal of criminal aliens will 
decrease, further overcoming the resource hurdle while simultaneously uniting the vested 
stakeholders and megacommunity members in ICE’s mission to identify, detain and 
remove all criminal aliens.   
Finally, ICE’s 287(g) program should be expanded to provide more local law 
enforcement with immigration officer capabilities.  Only a small portion of DRO officials 
interviewed confirmed the presence of 287(g) local law enforcement within their 
jurisdiction.  However, all those interviewed confirmed that having local law 
enforcement act as immigration officers is a force multiplier that is of low cost to ICE.  
287(g) authority puts boots on the ground where ICE does not have a presence.  The full 
potential of this twelve-year-old statute has not been realized.  The conservation of ICE 
resources can best be accomplished through full utilization of the 287(g) program.  
Again, the 287(g) program further unites vested stakeholders into the megacommunity of 
ICE’s Criminal Alien Program.   
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VII. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The creation of a megacommunity amongst the stakeholders involved in the CAP 
should be included in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  An effective and efficient strategy 
for the removal of criminal aliens from the United States must be explored.  There are 
some involved in counterterrorism efforts that currently do not recognize the removal of 
criminal aliens as vital to homeland security efforts.  ICE’s Secure Communities 
initiative appears to be on the right course to developing a long term plan for the efficient 
and effective removal of criminal aliens.  It sets forth a bold vision for ICE’s critical role 
in future of Homeland Security.   
By developing partnerships within the law enforcement community, all involved 
will maximize the potential resources available in pursuit of the common goal of 
removing criminal aliens from the United States.  Local communities will undoubtedly 
benefit from the removal of these criminals simply by making their streets safer for their 
residents.  The potential for prisoner radicalization will be eliminated.  The funding of 
terrorist activity through criminal acts will be disrupted.  ICE will move closer to 
achieving their goals of securing the homeland with the removal of these criminals.  
Securing our homeland against the dangers of criminal aliens is the overriding goal that 
will unite all parties and drive the development of ICE’s CAP at every local and county 
jail.282 
                                                 
282 The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author in her individual capacity, and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland 
Security, or the U.S. government. 
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